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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Methods, Goals, and Summary Conclusions 
 
Hanns Eisler and Theodor Adorno‟s Composing for the Films (Oxford University Press, 
1947) remains a standard textbook reference on the problems and problematics of composing 
music for the commercial film. The textbook is essentially an expanded treatment of Eisler‟s 
motivations, observations, and conclusions, informed with Adorno‟s critical judgments of music 
and musical effects in the contemporary moment, in regards to his Film Music Project in which 
Eisler composed new scores for a variety of existing films, from animated short to documentary 
to narrative feature. The project was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and administered 
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from 1940 through 1942 at the New School for Social Research located in New York City. But 
the relationship of the text to the project has long remained unclear. Since Adorno was not 
technically involved in the Film Music Project, the kind and degree of his contributions to 
Composing for the Films has been a matter of speculation.  This confusion is related to another, 
more important set of questions relating to the methods of the project itself, which have persisted 
as the text has become a canonical reference in studies of film music over the past 60 years. 
While the text‟s usefulness has historically been seen to rest in the ways in which it 
aimed at providing a critique and to some degree an alternative methodology to dominant 
practices of Hollywood film music production – an alternative which would place film music 
neither in the overt performance mode of the musical nor the largely secondary position of 
supplying “mood” for largely image – and dialogue-based narrative features – critics have 
complained over the intervening half century since its publication that the text itself fails on both 
these counts.  Charges that the text is repetitive and, poorly formed as critique,  have plagued the 
work since before its publication (see below); and as recently as 1998, musicologist Nicholas 
Cook maintained that while Eisler proposes a mode of structuring the relations between image 
and music that would be antithetical to the dominant classical Hollywood practice, nevertheless 
the composer simply reversed the specific function of film music from illustrative parallelism to 
agitative counterpoint, failing to either explain how meaning arises in the combination of sound 
and image or to broaden film music practice as a result of achieving such an understanding. It‟s 
true that Eisler attempted to reverse “parallelism” with “counterpoint,” to create film music that 
would work against the image and destabilize the ideological dominants working through the 
techniques of mediated vision; though it should also be mentioned that Eisler certainly claimed 
usefulness for both parallel and contrapuntal methods.  
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But a central problem lurks: why should music in film be the vehicle for either 
parallelism or counterpoint? In other words, why, in a theoretical sense, should music be taken 
up as the missing element that completes the film, and in completing it, warranting its aesthetic 
value?  Especially in the case of Eisler, whose Rockefeller Foundation-funded Film Music 
Project revolved around re-scoring already edited film sequences, the usual Hollywood 
composer‟s complaint that music was too often treated as a secondary and inessential element 
was turned on its head.  In effect, while Eisler‟s goals for the film music project putatively 
revolved around raising standards for composition in film music, there is a reverse metonymy 
operating in its logic – music comes in to stand, not for the film itself, but for the art of film more 
broadly, since film suffers as an art if its music is not worthy.  A logic of musical exceptionalism 
circulates through the pages of Composing for the Films. 
That text‟s claims of the power of music composition to elevate film aesthetics, that is, in 
that context, to make entirely contemporary the resources available to the technically mediated 
work of mass culture and bring to cinema its optimum aesthetic and cultural effect, turned not 
only on the recent technological maturity of sound film, but also stemmed from the 
contradictions inherent in the film production process where multiple creative personnel labored 
on a multimedia work for mass audiences (generally, in the case of cinema, resolving primary 
authorship of the completed work in favor of the director, not the composer or the writer, as 
opposed to television conventions, which grant significant authorial authority to the producer as 
opposed to the director).  Further and more fundamentally, the logic of Eisler and Adorno‟s 
commentary depended on music‟s ambiguous capacities for articulating representational 
meaning in the visual mimesis of “reality” captured in a pro-filmic image.  The notion that a 
work of mass culture circulating among broad cross-sections of national and international 
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populations fails to offer redeeming social values, or worse, actively compromises common 
sense values or indeed circulates harmful messages and actively harms the morality and 
principles of its audiences is a claim routinely applied to television, video games, music video, or 
the internet/web most recently. Yet the charge is ancient, and in the twentieth century was made 
variously about modern literature, the nickelodeon, or the cinema as well. Music has been no 
exception, of course, as recent charges about rap musicians confirm; in the 1930s, radio 
broadcasting was perhaps an auditory version of that “vast wasteland” which FCC Commissioner 
Newton Minow famously would find television to be in 1961. Eisler and Adorno‟s concerns, 
then, were not atypical, but an inflection, in the idiom of critical theory and serial music 
composition, of broadly circulating concerns over the effects of mass media. 
But what we might call in Eisler a musical exceptionalism – the belief that music – rather 
than, say, cinematic realism or critical documentary -- might redeem cinema suggests a 
particularly interesting set of questions about the goals and context of his film music study 
carried out at the New School for Social  Research with support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation.  What did Eisler aim to achieve, particularly, by testing multiple film scores against 
a single film or film sequence?  Was he aiming at applying music theory to film soundtracks, or, 
more importantly, was he aiming more generally at a film music praxis entailed by a larger 
critical theorization of film as mass art?  The difference here is important, because at issue is 
whether we are properly evaluating Eisler and Adorno‟s text and Eisler‟s film music work and 
on what grounds: music for cinema, or composing mass media?  That is, should the book be 
considered a poorly executed discussion of film music, as Virgil Thomson suggested it was, or a 
study that does not make enough of music?  Or rather, should it be considered as a pragmatic 
challenge to industrial cinema to innovate with respect to its “social functions,” and thus, a 
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musical and auditory intervention conceived from the point of view of social theories which 
considered serial music as an advanced form of industrialized, rationalized aesthetics?   Taking 
the latter approach means treating Eisler as a creative worker with ideas about organizing film 
production as much as about composing music for cinema; it requires, in turn, a broader critical 
account which locates a logic of musical or auditory exceptionalism operating not only in the 
film work but, of course, in the cultural and institutional conditions of its times.  In other words, 
if today “digital convergence” or Web 2.0 supplies many of the rhetorical meanings in 
explanations about how media change, why was it, around 1940, that “listening” held that 
function, at least in the context of Eisler‟s Film Music Project?   
Ultimately, of course, it is impossible to disentangle entirely the critical orientation and 
function of such a logic of musical exceptionalism from musicologically informed critiques of 
aesthetics, form, and social meaning as long as the music in question relies on evaluative musical 
aesthetics, whether traditional or contemporary.  The difficulties arising in the analyses of critical 
philosophers like Adorno – whether, for instance, his well-known and much-cited negative 
comments on jazz indicate that his mode of analysis  is indebted to a “Mandarin,” racist elitism – 
suggests, though, that even Adorno‟s subtle analysis of “deviation” and musical structure as 
immanent to the analysis required in any performance of a musical score suggests that 
immanence, as Lacoue-LaBarthes has said of Heideggerian transcendence, ends in politics. But 
the larger point is that there are questions of greater importance than relating musicological form 
to political effects if what is at stake, as we find in Eisler, is an effort working according to a 
logic of musical exception to transform the cinema through an open, only quasi-systemic 
intervention into cinema scoring where cinema reception is taken, before it is considered a site 
for the delivery of musical products, as a site of political effects. There is more at stake, then, 
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than Eisler and Adorno‟s own suggestion that film music composition was an opportunity to 
deploy the “resources” of the “new music,” that is, to modernize the musical practices of the 
cinema industry so that this most advanced industrial art form could be considered truly 
contemporary in style, internationally-oriented, and aesthetically complete.   
The larger question becomes clear once we phrase that distinction. Let‟s consider that 
Eisler‟s project was critically rather than merely musicologically oriented, that is, aimed at 
remediating cinematic representation by emphasizing auditory sense and meaning, where cinema 
is understood to work in combination with other mass media forms like radio, phonography, or 
theater, and not simply in terms of autonomous musical forms, and where affect prompted in the 
site of reception is as much about active listening practices as about the tendency for the 
industrial cinema image to atomize individual desire within mass culture (that is, to compose for 
the films some critical redemption from what Eisler, Adorno, Brecht, or Horkheimer believed 
was the culture industries‟ great capacity for mass deception).  In this case, then, what does this 
musical exceptionalism – again, in this case, not at all a marginal, experimental, or alternative 
practice but one situated in the very heart of the mid-twentieth century U.S. cultural institutions 
and industries -- say about the ways music as it was heard, whether in combination with other 
media, whether aesthetically up-to-date or “regressive,” was understood to be undergoing 
transformations according to cultural, political, and technological forces in the advanced 
industrial nations of the middle 20
th
 century?  To what degree had music become a mode of 
envisioning what we would call today “convergent” media practices, that is, the affinities in 
production, distribution, and reception of distinct media properties mediated in terms of 
consumer “interaction”?  Most centrally, for Eisler and for the Rockefeller Foundation more 
broadly, what did it mean to listen critically in a reception context popularly understood as 
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dominated by the image?  How, in other words, was active, critical reception thought to be 
transposed, via some ameliorative practices of listening, out of passive consumption? 
The questions this research aimed to answer, then, are the following: in the formulation 
of Eisler‟s film music project, how were the goals determined to go beyond theories of music 
composition or aesthetics?  How was the project strategically supported by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and on what basis was the project accepted?  How did the Rockefeller Foundation‟s 
interest in the project align or intersect with other projects funded by the Foundation?  What 
were the goals and outcomes of these projects, and in the case of aligned or intersecting goals or 
outcomes, what do those intersections suggest about the production of musical forms and media 
forms, about theories and practices of listening?  If concerns driving the research in Eisler‟s case 
were shared with other projects, do these indicate other materials, reception practices, or formal 
aesthetic practices which might clarify Eisler‟s aims and results?  
The research entailed a thorough reading of documents pertaining to three projects 
funded in the late 1930s and early 1940s by the Rockefeller Foundation which had significant or 
primary interests in music or musical sound; and a brief inspection of Rockefeller Foundation 
documents relating to programming and policy decisions relating to these projects.  The projects 
researched in addition to that of Eisler‟s include the Princeton Radio Listening Project, which 
was structured as a reception study of radio broadcasting generally, but, while interested in news 
broadcasters and advertising, also observed that the majority of radio listening was to musical 
material.  Significantly, Theodor Adorno contributed to this project under the direction of social 
psychologist Paul Lazarsfeld, producing an important if not conflicted inflection of 
psychoanalytic theory with post-Marxist critical theory.  In addition to a number of important 
documents which indicate that the broad success of the Princeton project helped pave the way for 
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other projects related to music and listening, I will discuss Adorno‟s contributions to the 
Princeton Project and relate these to Eisler‟s project and the development of the Eisler/Adorno 
text, Composing for the Films. 
An additional project, initiated after the Princeton project but before Eisler‟s, was 
directed by Harold Burris-Meyer, audio engineer and drama instructor at New Jersey‟s Stevens 
Institute of Technology. Burris-Meyer is a particularly interesting figure in the question of 
musical sound in the mid-20
th
 century, since his interests and contributions extended from 
developing flexible audio environments for sound effects and music in the theatre intended to 
benefit not only motion pictures but also the then-emergent production format of television; to 
providing consulting services to the Muzak Corporation, which used his expertise to optimize 
sound installations in factories so that emotional motivation of workers achieved through music 
would not be adversely effected by factory noise, and so that loudspeaker announcements 
providing central control of distributed work environments would remain functional despite 
musical broadcast; and to contributions to the War Department (later to become the Department 
of Defense)
1
 during World War II, including building speaker arrays deployed on warplanes such 
that enemy combatants could be addressed from the air.  
The archival sources suggest that Burris-Meyer was more broadly interested in the 
emotional manipulation and control of masses of people through auditory media. His move from 
engineering audio environments for the dramatic theatre to engineering audio environments for 
theatres of war implies what might be called an only loosely coherent musical behaviorism.  In 
fact, it appears that it was precisely this dangerously incoherent aspect of Burris-Meyer‟s work 
which seems to have spelled the end of Rockefeller Foundation funding after several successful 
                                                     
1
 Burris-Meyer, Harold and Edward C. Cole.  Scenery for the Stage: The Organization, Processes, Materials, and Techniques Used to Set the 
Stage. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1938. 
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outcomes achieved through Rockefeller support.  What is most relevant to the Eisler project here 
is the primary emphasis on audience reaction, on musical sound at the point of reception.  
However, Rockefeller personnel introduced Eisler to Burris-Meyer, it seems, and documents 
show that the Foundation hoped at one point that some collaboration could be achieved; in 
addition, it appears that Rockefeller personnel were careful to structure funded projects so that 
complementary interests could be brought to bear on each other, presumably whether 
participants were completely aware of the methodologies and implications of neighboring 
projects.  Thus, Eisler not only met Burris-Meyer in New Jersey, but was briefed about the 
Princeton radio project also, and informed of several of the advances made there in the area of 
gathering information about audience response to musical meaning. 
Finally, In addition to researching the Rockefeller Archive Center‟s holdings on these 
three projects, I also reviewed policy and programming statements relevant to the projects 
themselves as well as to the questions around cultures of listening, music, and audio culture 
which I have raised regarding their mutual structuring.  Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, 
we are able to piece together the importance of these three projects both for each other in their 
own day, and for their implications for the larger historical and critical contexts of middle to late 
20
th
 century technological media and their reception. All did not proceed as Rockefeller 
Foundation personnel might have hoped: Adorno‟s work seems to have been understood only 
after his departure from the Princeton Radio Project; the Foundation‟s Assistant Director for the 
Humanities, John Marshall, found Adorno and his work unyielding in conference with audio 
industry professionals.  Eisler, as is well known, was forced to undergo deportation after years of 
harassment by the FBI, culminating in embarrassing publicity for the Foundation. Burris-Meyer 
became convinced that audio control of human emotions was possible for a large enough portion 
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of an audience to provide effective crowd control – a line of research his contact at the 
Rockefeller Foundation, John Marshall, ultimately found irrelevant for understanding the artistic 
or cultural values of music.  
Thus, following musical meaning purposefully through the domains of radio, theatre, and 
motion pictures meant inadvertent excursions into the sternly cynical heights of critical theory 
with Adorno in the late 1930s and early 1940s, into sonic warfare and musical behaviorism as 
Burris-Meyer‟s succeeded his early Rockefeller-supported activities with work for the 
Department of Defense and the Muzak Corporation in the early 1940s, and into false accusations 
of aiding communism in the case of Eisler in the middle 1940s. Yet with the highly productive 
results as well as the unintended outcomes of the Rockefeller Foundation‟s music projects, the 
Foundation demonstrated the new status of music as a determining factor in a historical phase in 
which media “convergence” was thought to proceed more through listening as an ambivalent 
behavior than through a single, transformed technical substrate (as in “digital” convergence 
theories).   
Eisler‟s project, although funded after both Burris-Meyer and Princeton, arguably took on 
concerns arising in each of those earlier projects, and further allowed those concerns to be 
conceived in terms of cinema, a medium which not only combined music with the power of the 
moving image, but did so on an internationally accepted mass scale.  Musical sound in this 
historical context operates in terms of a species of convergence less in terms of media 
technology but rather in terms of cultural forms and industrial practices. It is in this way that 
musical sound could become the anchor for what I‟ve called the musical exceptionalism of 
Eisler‟s project; this musical exceptionalism grounded Eisler‟s intervention into the Hollywood 
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film.
2
 This larger context suggests that while the Film Music Project may have taken its materials 
from contemporary debates on musical and filmic aesthetics, more broadly in fact it did function 
as a critical intervention into commercial film practice. Of course, Eisler‟s was not the only 
project funded to investigate aspects of the movies. However, Eisler‟s project was an activity 
whose focus on musical meaning allowed the benefits of a broadly intermedial focus and strategy 
in its relation to other projects.   
Still, if Eisler‟s project was significant as a musical intervention into the industrial arts of 
the movies, its significance comes neither, strictly speaking, in terms of an artisanal mode of 
alternative production (as James, 2006, describes in regards to figures of the Los Angeles avant-
garde), nor in specifically technological advances, of which advances in film industry sound 
mixing and recording, on the one hand, or new techniques for audience response measurement, 
of which Eisler was well aware, nor, finally, in terms of an avant-garde that was conceived as 
oppositional in ethos.  His critical orientation while receiving Rockefeller support, and indeed, 
while working in the Los Angeles film industry, was rather towards the material of the interface 
between the film music composer as theorist-musician, the cultural critic of mass commodity 
production (Adorno, who co-authored the major legacy of his work for Rockefeller, Composing 
for the Films) and Rockefeller grant administrators, administration methods, and other 
Rockefeller projects.  Eisler‟s film music project, then, is a key instance of a complex mediation 
between cultural institutions, cultural criticism, and cultural industries.   
Other Rockefeller projects, the establishment of the American Film Center, for example, 
indicate that Eisler‟s project was itself part of an attempt to better understand and intervene in a 
relationship between mass audiences and mass culture that was thought to hold dangerous 
                                                     
2 While to some degree the new optical film of the late 1920s had allowed a technological convergence enabling the sound-mixed film and in 
providing a recording and mixing and distribution medium foreshadowing the capacities of the multimedia computer, this would only have been a 
partial convergence in technological terms.  Radio, for example, imported cinema’s large 15 inch discs so that by the early 1940s live radio was 
becoming a thing of the past. 
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propensities for mass deception, but not necessarily from any specifically critical orientation in 
either a Frankfurt School, psychoanalytic, or cultural sense but rather in light of two major 
understandings reflected in documents pertaining to all three of these projects and reflected in 
policy statements.  First, the Foundation understood that mass audiences and mass culture could 
be a dangerous combination on the one hand, since historical truths did not necessarily make for 
good films; it was seen as ironic that such a scientifically endowed medium as cinema routinely 
told stories that were scientifically absurd.  Second, authority figures from governmental, 
academic, cultural, and corporate media enterprises all shared concern to one degree or another 
that the research interests and capacities of commercial interests (in radio for example) had 
become dominant in what was seen partly as a public organ, and therefore had engendered a 
contradiction: audio and audiovisual mass media were seen to have evolved a powerful form in 
which to educate or enlighten the public but because this development had come through 
commercial concerns, little understanding had been made of precisely their communicative 
potential as such.  That technical, educational, and aesthetic aims understood to be at stake in 
Eisler‟s project, then, is indicative of the importance that music-related studies had at this point 
in time. 
Rockefeller support for the American Film Center and other significant Foundation 
projects oriented toward the motion picture industry and film culture generally await additional 
research.  In any case, the particular significance of the Rockefeller music projects is that, by 
observing musical movements across the media, a new problematic was arrayed wherein art, 
education, technology, and social action were not only seen to be intimately concerned with one 
another but at the same time, their motives, origins, or effects unfortunately conflated with one 
another. Crucially, this interrelation and this conflation was thought through the lens of music.  
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In this sense, Eisler‟s abbreviated scores included in the appendices of Composing for the Films 
are more than musical scores – they are graphical appendages to a critical text generated at the 
heart of the vexing question of media programming and mass agency in an age when 
collectivization was thought to be all but inevitable.  As contemporary researchers in Germany 
and elsewhere begin to piece together remaining fragments and versions, it is important to 
remember that the scores attached to Composing for the Films may as much serve as incomplete 
diagrams of larger administrative and theoretical concerns and challenges for the mid-century 
U.S. media industries as much as the scores may indicate important developments in Eisler‟s 
career.  This project thus aimed at recovering relations among these three important mid-century 
research projects in modern, mass cultural listening, from radio, to cinema, to theater. 
 
Chapter 2 
Policies for Enlightening, Programs for Listening 
 
 According to archive documents, the Foundation originally took an interest in mass 
media when in 1934 the trustees “asked us to take an interest in these media as a means „to 
widen the area of public appreciation.‟”3  Early discussions about funding projects in mass media 
at the Rockefeller Foundation clearly indicate the central problem, indeed, the reason for the 
importance for these projects.  The Foundation was initially unsure whether to fund these 
projects through the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation or whether they should 
be funded as educational projects through the allied General Education Board.  The discussion 
here turned, it appears, on whether media were to serve education or culture.  To the degree that 
the mass media were considered to wield power and influence, their role was undeniably 
educational, regardless of the actual content – and hence, concern on the part of the Rockefeller 
administrators as to the use of film or radio for propaganda.  On the other hand, to the degree that 
                                                     
3 Program and Policy – Public Opinion 1942 : RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 51 
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these new media had been developed and dominated by largely commercial interests, their 
potential benefits to the public had been obscured by profit-oriented industrial practices. 
In inter-office correspondence responding to meetings on this topic and dated January 22, 
1936, David Stevens writes that the media of film and radio are of “great importance for formal 
education and for the general diffusion of culture.” However, vested interests “virtually prevent 
taking chances with anything that does not have demonstrated „entertainment value‟ for the 
public at large.”  It is not too strong to say that in Stevens‟ eyes this development is a disaster for 
the humanities in contemporary culture.  The effect of commercial exploitation of the new media 
is that while advanced technology and production techniques have radically expanded the 
potential of media materials, Stevens continues:  
[…] as yet relatively little is actually known of the possibilities that radio and motion pictures offer.  It is, 
indeed, almost as if language had been used only for purposes of advertising: little by little its possibilities 
for other purposes would be recognized; but only when as those who recognized them were freed from the 
domination of commercial purpose would they discover much of what we know of the uses of language 
both in literature and in science.
4
 
 
Stevens saw that whatever the “language” of the new media might ultimately be, it was being 
severely stunted in both its aesthetic and scientific potential by the overwhelming importance of 
commercial success.  The practical question then is how to explore the educational and cultural 
uses of film and radio.  How, simply, to begin? Find academics and practitioners at home in the 
new media, and let them lead the way with guidance and support from the Foundation.  Stevens‟ 
conclusions provide insight into the way the Foundation supported and structured innovation: 
The most promising way of achieving this end seems to be in offering a few younger men with a talent for 
these mediums (sic) an opportunity for relatively free experimentation.   
 
Such experimentation would be given to men selected so as to produce work that would be:  
 
directed toward serious purposes – men interested primarily in education, literature, criticism, or in 
disseminating the findings of the social or natural sciences.  While their experimentation would not lack 
                                                     
4 Program and Policy – Public Opinion 1942: RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 50, 1. 
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direction, it would not be limited by a too narrow concept of its purposes, but would be free to explore 
whatever possibilities the interests of the experimenters suggested as vital.
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Dividing between formal education and culture would be too artificial; “… in general, the 
predominating aim should be the free development of the medium.”  For this reason, all projects 
were to be allocated to one general program (that is, neither exclusively educational nor cultural).  
Realistically, however, decisions had to be made so that strategic funding could take place; 
Stevens‟ proposal was amended at a staff conference on May 7, 1936 to the effect that projects 
were to be routed through the Humanities Division of the Foundation unless they had direct 
bearing on classroom and school programs, in which case presumably they were to go through 
the General Education Board. 
The Princeton Radio Project‟s initial primary investigator, Hadley Cantril, and Paul 
Lazarsfeld, who actually directed it once it was granted; Stevens Institute of Technology‟s 
Harold Burris-Meyer; the New School for Social Research‟s Hanns Eisler – all fit Stevens‟ 
description of persons both highly conceptually oriented and talented as practitioners. 
Lazarsfeld‟s team would concentrate on innovating methods and technologies for gathering 
information as to radio listening behaviors that might indicate cultural patterns instead of 
advertising potential, and thus, not unlike those analyses of television that cultural scholars of 
reception would attempt in the 1980s. Eisler had been involved in both progressive cultural 
activities as well as early sound film production in Germany, and brought the ability to turn 
advanced musical composition techniques to popular cultural milieus; famously, he had 
disavowed Schoenberg‟s modernist ideology but deployed Schoenberg‟s methods of harmonic 
innovation to compose musically sophisticated popular song that was nonetheless highly 
accessible to everyday listeners.   Finally, Burris-Meyer had experimented for years with audio 
                                                     
5 Ibid, 2. 
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engineering in the dramatic theatre, and had already produced experimental drama with the stage 
conceived as a laboratory for auditory innovations that would ultimately benefit other media. All 
these grantees met Steven‟s criteria in having demonstrated the ability to merge theoretical with 
practical concerns in an experimental approach to their chosen field; all would work out 
expansive conceptual frameworks and then subsequently allow detailed work to inflect and re-
define those frameworks as the result of an experimental method –at least in terms of process.  
The model of cultural innovation here relied on guided experimentation, but crucially, this 
guiding was oriented towards remediation of a perceived crisis in the humanities, not towards 
technological or other ends.  
Additional academic expertise along with technical or industrial advice would be secured 
by calling in consultants at appropriate moments in the relevant process.  “Relatively free 
experimentation” was to put the scientific and poetic evolution of the advanced, technicized 
“languages” of culture back on track.   Rather than being determined by purely commercial 
interests, this experimentation‟s relative limits would be those determined through the cultural 
administrators of the Foundation.  Thus, outcomes for each project would face a difficult 
challenge – not only does experimentation in a cultural or aesthetic field often simply lead 
further afield, and not back around towards helping to clarify a conceptual framework, divining 
whether specific projects contributed in a way proportionate with the money spent on them to 
general cultural uplift would pose specific challenges.  Of course, each grant would include a 
scheme for evaluation, but nonetheless, it may be that some of the unintended –although not 
necessarily negative -- outcomes of these projects might have had to do with the vicissitudes of 
this relatively open-ended strategy for creating vital uses of the mass media. 
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The value of radio research in particular was addressed in a document entitled “Next Jobs 
in Film and Radio.” This document, written by John Marshall, asserted that a dangerous 
alienation existed in the radio public, caught between infeasible aspiration – often primed by the 
unrealistic fantasies of radio and film – and actual accomplishment.  Thus, the value of listening 
research in the Princeton project was framed as a place for potentially productive work in the 
areas between mental health and mass mediation.  Further, the Princeton Project suggested to 
Marshall that similar attention should be paid to motion pictures. I quote the document at length: 
Thus, for example, research has now brought the Princeton Project to the point of saying that the existing 
discrepancy between individual aspiration and accomplishment is a fruitful area for further study at a time 
when our culture (e.g. through broadcasting) is postulating aspirations, for the realization of which it is not 
supplying the requisite economic and educational means.  Recognizing this area as fruitful, the Project is 
now proceeding to discover what wants radio would have to serve, if it were to aid in overcoming (or 
modifying) tensions which existing discrepancies give rise to. 
 
If this second job is one for social psychology, the Princeton Project should yield a pathology of ignorance 
on which radio could base its efforts to widen public appreciation of the various fields of knowledge.  A 
next step, then, should be a similar study of the motion picture audience, -- the feasibility of which JM is 
now looking into. 
 
If these two jobs are undertaken, a third job, with things as they are, is virtually inevitable; namely, to clear 
the way for an appreciation of genuine knowledge in the various fields, by aiding the public to recognize 
the essential incompleteness of what is now too frequently offered – in effect, the exploration of what 
might be called the „pathology of influence.‟  Here perhaps is a constructive approach to the problem of 
propaganda – seemingly the only approach sufficiently objective to be appropriate for an agency like the 
Foundation.” 
 
Here, the main thing to be learned by the public about propaganda is what it does not impart, that is, that it 
is incomplete, when contrasted with genuine knowledge.  But in using the mass media to achieve these 
aims, is it in fact strengthening the tendencies towards “collectivism”? 
 
Actually, this is not a question to be answered by the Foundation, but rather by the society it serves.  Its job, 
then, is to discover: (in bold in original) if our society is willing to let collectivism take its course; or, if not, 
in what respects it wishes to modify that course.  In other words, in what respects would this collectivistic 
trend run counter to folkways implicit in our culture, to a degree that would produce dangerous strains in 
our social structure? 
 
This question evidently rests on another assumption, that one safeguard against the occurrence of such 
strains is to give the public as full a knowledge of their probable character as much in advance of their 
actual occurrence as is humanly possible, and so to give society an opportunity to anticipate the 
consequences of current developments before they have come to the point of serious strain. 
 
In this job, the first step, then, is to make explicit folk ways implicit in our culture, with which a collectivist 
trend would come into conflict.  In one sense, collectivism itself is such a folkway, as is evidenced, for 
example, by the general welfare and interstate commerce clauses of the Constitution – not to mention 
subsequent legislation based on them which now has complete public acceptance.  But other folkways 
undoubtedly existed which would inevitably come into varying degrees of conflict with an increasingly 
18 
 
collectivistic trend, as for example, those which cluster under the heading of individual freedom of thought 
speech and action (sic), or others connected with the view that our society resolves its conflicts by reason 
rather than by force or authority.
6
 
 
For Marshall, radio and film are thus central organs (the metaphor of the healthy body is invoked 
in the document, and the problem is that the public does not have knowledge of the healthy 
functioning of cells, the “cellular structure of our society”) of what will be a “democratic 
propaganda.” 
If the thinking citizens, which we hope a reorganized general education can produce, are to play their part 
in our society, the present influence of radio and film is crucial.  Without the guidance this fourth job can 
provide, we have no assurance what that influence will be.   
 
With it we have a basis for what might properly be regarded as a democratic propaganda, democratic in the 
sense that the cultural will of the majority might be helped to prevail; democratic, too, in the sense that 
there need be no concealment of its ends.  It would, in fact, expose its purposes, and invite scrutiny of them, 
confident that its ultimate persuasion was that of reason than of will.  To establish such propaganda actually 
might be an important first step in establishing the legitimate influence of radio and film in a society like 
ours.
7
  
 
The difficult position that Marshall is working out here has specifically to do with the 
relationship between collectivism, that is, radical progressive thought, and mass culture.  Is there 
an inherent, perhaps “ideological” function in the operation of the mass media such that it 
produces collectivity?  If so, can such collectivism be democratic, or is any such collectivist 
formation one based on force or coercive persuasion?  By defining collectivization as a negative 
outcome, and yet by observing that the mass media speak to collected masses, Marshall is left 
with a quandary about the society that would be either persuaded to impulsive action or to 
democratic ideals through mass means.  Because of the way these terms have been set out, what 
that society is like is never really defined other than it is seen to be ignorant (completely 
divorced from means and scene of production by virtue of the facts of reception of film and 
radio), subject to influence by unseen authors, and yet at the same time, inherently democratic 
                                                     
6 Program and Policy, Public Opinion 1942: RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 50, “Next Jobs in Film and Radio,” 7 – 8, RF date 9/13/38. This 
document circulated not only at the Foundation but also was sent to colleagues at the BBC, which appears to have been often consulted on the 
problematics of mass media, cultural policy, public education, and propaganda 
7 ibid. 
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and anti-totalitarian by virtue of a reservoir of latent “folkways” which precede the rise of the 
mass media and might somehow ultimately form its ground.  
 These contradictions indicate the seriousness of the crisis precipitated for cultural 
administrators with the growing influence of mass media. As a side note, it is interesting to 
compare this description of folk behaviors that might be elicited and emphasized to resist 
totalitarian collectivism with Ernst Bloch‟s notion of non-contemporaneity elaborated only 
slightly earlier before Bloch‟s emigration to New York: archaic, pre-capitalist practices which, in 
surviving into and in spite of the capitalist age, might indicate routes for revolutionary renewal.
8
  
Of course, Bloch was writing as a critical theorist holding sympathies for German communist 
and collectivist movements, while Marshall appears, at least here, rather as an American liberal.  
Each tradition, as it will be seen, accounts for the contradictions of mass audiences and 
mediation in distinct ways. 
 In 1940, a memo from John Marshall confirms that the funding of art and of reception 
studies were conceived as complementary.  Marshall suggests that a proposal to study a 
reception study of the motion picture audience similar to the Princeton Radio Project be 
considered.  The difficulty, though, was locating such a project – Princeton Radio would 
ultimately move to Columbia for reasons of academic coherence, geographic expediency, 
research compatibility, and so forth.  Eisler‟s project was considered important for what it might 
bring to light about listening in the motion picture context – not simply for its musical 
innovations or compositional art.  The project is described, in the context of an appreciation for 
the usefulness of reception studies, as a project developing the art of film.  Any particular interest 
in the art of music itself is definitely subordinate to these larger concerns and contexts; in 
                                                     
8 Bloch, Ernst, see, for example, Spirit of Utopia; or for the more specific account, Heritage of Our Times 
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addition, Burris-Meyer‟s project on sound-effects is seen specifically as a parallel effort together 
with which Eisler‟s project was to be understood in its strategic importance. 
At present, our only investment in this field is in Eisler‟s project at the New School.  That of course typifies 
a rather different kind of research – research which aims at developing the art of motion pictures.  
Consideration of the Association of Documentary Film Producers‟ request for a more general study of this 
kind makes me doubt the wisdom of support for anything but specific projects like Eisler‟s.  That 
enterprise, particularly in conjunction with Burris-Meyer‟s studies of sound effects, seems likely to yield 
results of real significance for the art.
9
 
 
The outcome of this discussion was to focus film projects on the American Film Center, although 
it was noted that funds for a Black (“negro” in the archive documents) film production were 
being recommended through the GEB. 
 At approximately this point in time, the Foundation had projects funded or had recently 
terminated projects categorized as follows; importantly, Eisler‟s project is categorized not as film 
production but rather as “Film Research,” suggesting that indeed the critical orientation of the 
project in terms of learning to compose not so much for the films but for audience response was 
the defining value of Eisler‟s work from the Foundation‟s standpoint.  
 
Radio: 
Experiments in Broadcasting, University Broadcasting Council  
World Wide Broadcasting Foundation  
Rocky Mountain Radio Council (all RF grants)  
University of Wisconsin School Broadcasting, terminated 1939  
Cleveland Board of Education Experiment in School Broadcasting, terminated December 1939 
(both GEB grants) 
Research in Radio: Office of Radio Research, Columbia, granted until September 1941 
Princeton Radio Listening Center, current grant-in-aid to expire June 1940 
                                                     
9 Program and Policy – Public Opinion 1942 : RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 49, memo, March 26, 1940, “DHS from JM” 
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Harvard University, Charles Siepmann‟s lectureship in broadcasting (all RF grants) 
Ohio State University Evaluation of School Broadcasts, until June 1942 (GEB) 
 
Film Production and Distribution: 
American Film Center, current funds terminating January 1941 
Film Library Museum of Modern Art, current funds terminating June 1941 (both RF grants) 
GEB projects funded  
University of Minnesota for an experiment in film production  
Association of School Film Libraries 
Commission on Human Relations 
 
Film Research: 
Eisler study of effects of music in sound films (RF) 
American Council on Education Motion Picture Project (GEB) 
 
Thus, John Marshall‟s recommendation to Eisler that he seek help from the Hayes Office when 
in Hollywood soliciting film samples for his project:  Eisler‟s project was largely seen not simply 
as a contribution to film music or to music generally, but as an inquiry into the mechanisms of 
film as a medium with enormous cultural and social influence: mass media with a role conceived 
by Marshall as pedagogical more than ideological, to be sure. The Foundation‟s enlightened 
interest in art, technology, and education coincided and was informed by studies of public 
opinion and increasingly, in the war period, of studies of totalitarian communications. The 
massive cultural influence imputed to motion pictures on the basis of lessons learned from the 
Princeton Radio Project helped justify support for and interest in the other film projects listed 
above, although strictly speaking the Princeton Radio Project didn‟t establish the Foundation‟s 
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interest in motion pictures, but rather was simply one of the earlier projects to achieve results 
that might have been extended to motion pictures. There was also interest in funding an 
American Film Institute on the model of the London Film Society; in regard to this latter, 
concerns came together about youth consumption of films, films‟ influence over public taste; 
availability and appropriateness of films to groups that want to screen them, and so forth.
10
 
By 1943, the Foundation was envisioning post-war projects in film and radio. They were 
interested in having Rudolph Arnheim to formulate a “positive aesthetics of mass 
communication.”  Specifically, they had noticed “boomerangs” in the work of Lazarsfeld‟s work 
with a program analyzer: effects which are the opposite of those intended by the mass mediated 
work, and the interest in Arnheim‟s aesthetic theory here may well be a pointed turn away from 
Adorno‟s dialectical aesthetic theory which found little redemption, and much contradiction at 
work in the midst of mass media cultural prominence, corporate media development and 
ownership, and mass audience agency. But the Foundation seems to have stayed its course.  By 
1949, the Foundation funded student training in television program development, recognizing 
that television programming would be the basis for television‟s competition with radio and 
film.
11
  In a post-script to the same memo, Marshall notes the wide influence of the seminal 
German Expressionist film Caligari, suggesting that he has long desired to find and support 
avant-garde work which might expand commercial production techniques.
12
   
What is revealed in these documents is, in effect, a long-term strategy evolving to 
combine an essentially modernist avant-gardism with liberal public and cultural policy with what 
appears as a largely nativist belief in the fundamentally democratic character of American 
traditions. The masses may be ignorant, but in this instance this ignorance was merely an effect 
                                                     
10 Program and Policy – Public Opinion 1942 : RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 49, March 26, 1940, marked as “DHS from JM” 
11 Program and Policy – Public Opinion 1942 : RG 3 Series 911 Box 5 Folder 51 , inter-office correspondence from John Marshall, June 14 1949 
12 ibid, 4. 
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of the successful rapid technological development of the mass media, and the combined efforts 
of administrators, educators, academics, and creative professionals could restore value to the 
overly commercial articulation of film and radio.  This intermedial approach to conceiving and 
strategizing projects in the production, distribution, and reception of mass media was underlined 
by the observation that uplifting the mass media would not be undertaken by industry alone; any 
such attempt would have to involve talented artists occupying a contradictory position as they 
applied an avant-garde orientation of one stripe or another to the reception of film, electronically 
enhanced theatre, or radio; and finally, would entail consultations between academics, 
industrialists, and technologists at different points and levels in the process.
13
 
Despite what appears to be a long-term consistency on the part of the Rockefeller 
Humanities Division in regards to media-as-culture, film and radio projects were mounted by the 
Foundation at a particular point in the history of the media themselves.  1934, the year that the 
Foundation trustees directed the Foundation to develop policy and programs in film and radio, is 
roughly the point at which the sound film conclusively had proved its dominance over non-sync 
film, and what‟s more, had largely put in place the dominant conventions for Hollywood 
narrative and musical films.  Sound effects, dialog, and music were now all routinely being 
deployed in the sound film, and equipment was available for sound mixing of these various types 
of auditory material according to what Altman has described as a model of “verisimilitude” that 
we can understand for our purposes here as, broadly speaking, auditory realism. Voices were 
matched to bodies; music faded down when important dialog was spoken; sound effects were 
mixed to momentarily interrupt music or dialog.  Sonically accurate reproductions of space were 
less important than the proper amplitude ratio of effect, voice, and music.  
                                                     
13 Heidegger’s roughly contemporaneous (1938) claim in “The Age of the World Picture” that knowledge production in the modern age was now 
the province of researchers who negotiated the exchange of data at conferences or meetings is interesting to consider in this light. 
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Thus, Eisler‟s project on “effects of music in sound film” should not be read as a project 
interested in a secondary register of meaning in the cinema, but rather, given the triumphant 
status of sound in cinema by the mid-1930s, rather, as a cutting-edge research project aimed at 
first, pushing the limits of understanding the audience experience in the cinema, by insisting on a 
popularly accessible yet technically advanced musical style that would parallel the advanced 
technical accomplishments of the image as mise-en-scene and montage.  For its part, radio had 
achieved national network penetration; beyond any of these particular media, music publishing 
was active in licensing and distributing properties across the motion picture, radio, and 
phonography industries.  Popular music, whether “serious” or “light,” moved through all the 
mass media – but the experience of listening to machines was strange for all its familiarity.   
Listening to machines, or machine listening?  In a way, this subtle distinction formed the point at 
which Theodor Adorno would clash with the Foundation‟s John Marshall. Adorno would 
perform one of the major intersections of psychoanalytic social theory with Frankfurt School 
critical theory under the auspices of the Princeton Radio Project in his work on the new, 
regressive, listening – but the achievement would not settle smoothly with the needs of 
Foundation administrators to balance interests between industrial conferees, academic colleagues 
accustomed to competing methodologies of study, and the study team of the Project. 
 
Chapter 3 
Music on the Air: Adorno and the Princeton Radio Research Project 
 
i. Overview of the Project and its Context: 
 
In a late 1940s presentation summarizing Rockefeller Foundation support of radio 
projects, John Marshall outlined the Foundation‟s specific goals and interests in radio. First, the 
Foundation and its affiliated researchers intended to discover those purposes to which radio 
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might be used to achieve broader public appreciation of a variety of different fields of 
knowledge.  Second, there was the question of the public interest: what did the public want from 
radio, and how could radio satisfy those ends? And finally, support for radio study projects was 
intended to further the study of propaganda. As indicated above, these goals were seen as 
relevant not only for radio but towards mass media more generally, as determined by the 
Trustees‟ direction.  The direction that radio studies might take would also help direct other 
studies to be undertaken in motion pictures.  
Dating from 1934 up until the time of Marshall‟s statement, the foundation had granted 
funds to ten projects, mostly oriented towards national and regional projects, but this group 
included at least one dedicated to the international reach of broadcasting. General interests of 
participants at the time included what we now call “distance learning.”  For instance, the 
National Music League‟s project aimed at stimulating listeners for “sophisticated” music, and in 
so doing, was thought to help provide opportunities for young musicians.  The projects listed 
below were radio projects deemed by Marshall, several years after Princeton Radio Research 
concluded, to have been companion projects, and so this is a cumulative list of the radio projects 
to the end of the 1940s: 
1. University Broadcasting Council of Chicago 
2. World Wide Broadcasting Foundation 
3. National Music League 
4. Radio Research at Princeton University 
5. Rocky Mountain Radio Council 
6. Harvard University 
7. Listening Center at Princeton University 
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8. Radio Research at Columbia University (continuation of the Princeton project) 
9. Listening Center at Stanford University 
10. Library of Congress 
Among these projects, the Princeton Radio Research Project aimed to answer the 
following questions, wrote Marshall: “What role does broadcasting play in the lives of listeners? 
Who listens? Where does listening take place? What is listened to? Why do people listen? How 
do they listen? What are the effects of listening?”14 
A committee of academics and industrial personnel was formed to advise the Foundation 
and the Princeton researchers, although these figures were not necessarily involved in the 
project‟s development after funding was granted or its grueling review, which ultimately granted 
continuance of the project but would relocate it from Princeton to Columbia.  The committee‟s 
make-up reflected the Foundation‟s interest in seeing views exchanged amongst the various 
interested sectors, and included Frederick Willis, assistant to the president of CBS; John Royal, 
Vice-President in charge of operations at NBC; James Baldwin, Executive Director of National 
Association of Broadcasters; Levering Tyson, National Advisory Council on Radio in Education; 
Hadley Cantril, Professor of Psychology in the School of Public Affairs at Princeton, and 
originator of the grant application; and W.W. Charters, a specialist in education and professional 
development at Ohio State University at the time, and a founding editor of the Journal of Higher 
Education.  The make-up of the panel at this point suggests two interesting points: one is that 
there were no specialists available on listening and that listening was conceived as a mediated 
cultural activity, not a neurological or a physiological capacity.  Interestingly, technical matters 
were likewise to be located at a much lower level of project administration, presumably to be 
                                                     
14 While these are the questions reviewed by Marshall long after the study concluded, in fact, they are taken from the document Project I, which 
as a result of Cantril’s proposal had previously been adapted from the Project 15 to be organized by the Federal Radio Education Committee. 
“Project I (Old Project No. 15): The Essential Value of Radio to All Types of Listeners” 200R 1.1 200 Box 271 Folder 3234. 
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determined by whoever would become director.  Intending to serve as director of the project, 
Cantril would submit to the Foundation the project proposal that ultimately would be funded, but 
the final application and its approval would emerge only after a significant period of time - 
approximately a year, judging by the dates of the archive documents - during which project 
development proceeded through consultations with the panel of industry, academic, and federal 
representatives. Radio research and policy, as far as the Foundation‟s Humanities Division was 
concerned, focused on two basic matters:  “cultural effectiveness,” and “range of public  
service.” 15 
In addition to the activities of the project itself, to which I will come shortly, two 
significant studies that had not been planned as part of the granted proposal were also made. A 
survey of listener interest through WIXAL in Boston was carried out with the conclusion that 
narrowly focused shortwave radio networks might provide educational solutions given the 
challenges of mass audiences and commercial broadcasting.  Paul Lazarsfeld, who would 
become the director of the Princeton Radio Research, remarked a propos this study: “Shortwave 
broadcasting is perfectly suited for teaching special interest groups … Even if there are only a 
few prospects in each community they can be tied together to an intellectual network… I feel 
convinced that the increasing use of shortwave stations will enforce a steadily increasing number 
of specialized stations ….”  And, in response to the mass hysteria occurring on the occasion of 
Orson Welles 1938 War of the Worlds broadcast, Hadley Cantril produced a monograph entitled 
The Invasion from Mars.  In summary, these two special projects neatly frame the concerns of 
the Foundation and the panel it convened: would radio be used to ameliorate problems of 
                                                     
15 200 R Radio (10 RF Projects) 1949 RG 1.1 Series 200 Box 275 Fldr 3277, “Radio: Introduction to 10 Projects in Radio to which the 
Rockefeller Foundation Contributed Support” 2. 
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transmitting information, or would it be used as a weapon of irrationality, propaganda that might 
cause chaos? Educational broadcasting had its work cut out for it. 
Granted for an initial two years, the project would run from early 1937 to early 1939 in 
an effort to isolate research problems and develop methodologies to handle them. The project 
would receive criticism for being too diffuse in its orientation, while receiving praise for its 
innovative opening up of possibilities.  In general, however, a broadly oriented survey of 
problems, methods, and techniques was exactly what had been called for during the initial two-
year term, and in spite of opinions to the effect that the project seemed too loosely formulated, its 
funding was renewed. However, participation by CBS meant that the project would maintain a 
field office in New York City; this secondary location contributed to Princeton Radio Research 
Project‟s isolation from other research activities at Princeton. While the project received 
continuance on the occasion of its first review, it would move to Columbia University shortly 
thereafter.
16
 
On the basis of insights gained from the Princeton Radio Research Project and in 
accordance with the Foundation‟s increased wartime interest in funding Totalitarian Studies, 
radio projects were extended to directly analyzing Nazi radio broadcasts.  Here, the earlier 
interest of the Princeton researchers in the authority of the newscaster and the emotional 
response of the audience crystallized, through an increasingly psychoanalytic lens, with Hans 
Speier and Ernst Kris being funded to study Hitler‟s wartime addresses to the German public, 
with funding beginning in 1941 and continuing with award money from April 1, 1942. Speier 
had been a Docent at the German Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin; Kris had been Assistant 
Curator for the Kunsthistorische Museum in Vienna, and Senior Research Office in the 
Monitoring Service of the BBC from the outbreak of war until July 1940. Kris had been a 
                                                     
16 Ibid 28 – 37. 
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member of the faculties of the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Vienna.  According to his CV, 
(Walter) Ernst Kris had been joint editor with Freud of Imago; International Review for 
Psychoanalysis and Imago, and The Collected Works of Sigmund Freud.  He cites as a comment 
with his CV that despite his expertise in the diverse fields of art history and psychology (which 
seemed little connected at the time, he says) “the common problem being that of man‟s reaction 
to the appeal of symbolic stimuli.”17  Questions for study included:   
1) To what degree to essentially political events, the speeches of German party leaders 
determine the presentation of the war in Germany?  
2) How do German and British broadcasts regarding the war to domestic audiences 
differ?  
3) What are the instructions given to Nazi speakers?  
4) How do historical concerns such as the views of the German Navy League and the 
German imperialists of the last war get taken up in current war news?  
Kris‟ expertise is expected to help train American specialists in analyzing German war radio. 18  
Kris proposed to “carry out research in the field of social psychology of totalitarian 
communication systems.”  Earlier analysis in Britain had resulted in a large, trained, research 
staff at the disposal of the British radio and intelligence services; the goal was to replicate that 
training for American radio and intelligence services. An interview of Kris by Marshall on 
December 12, 1940 brought this conclusion:  “Studies that Kris has made in London convince 
him of the possibility of going beyond the current flow of communication about the war to the 
means and the even to the instructions that underlie it, and definite instructions can safely be 
                                                     
17 200 R New School for Social Research Music Filming 1939 – 1941, RG 1.1 Series 200 Box 259 Folder 3098, Grant Resolution # 41014 
18 200 R New School for Social Research Music Filming 1939 – 1941, RG 1.1 Series 200 Box 259 Folder 3098, Grant Resolution #42030 
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taken for granted in the totalitarian countries.  Any clues to them could give added meaning to 
the current communications studies.” 19  
In this light, decoding the totalitarian message of the mass medium beyond the material 
flow of sound waves was to deliver the Fascist radio network, along with its own personnel 
nodes and networks, which was seen generating the overcoded instructions.  Having apparently 
arranged work for Kris with renowned social psychologist Harold D. Laswell at the New School, 
who would also serve on the review committee for the Princeton Radio Research Project, 
Marshall was faced with the question of how far such methods could go. This resolutely non-
empirical use of psychoanalytic social psychology to decode enemy chain of command and 
military intent was apparently worth the risk simply because of the potential value of its practical 
results.   “JM acknowledges that he is much impressed by Kris.  He is bound to agree with 
Laswell that he is a speculative thinker, but feels that if he is good at speculation his work might 
add much to the evidence that is now being gathered.  Furthermore, it seems undeniable that Kris 
has had unusual insight into the actual content of propaganda in Britain.  On the whole, 
therefore, he may be the man to undertake a study of the whole complex Nazi gleichshaltung.” 
Telegrams to and from the BBC and correspondence from Charles Siepmann confirm Marshall‟s 
interest in Kris and more broadly reflect the policy of the Foundation to consult with 
counterparts at the BBC on the feasibility and rationale of their policy and programs. 
 These developments reveal a hermeneutic influence whose strength increased in time 
over the course of the Princeton Radio Project: post-Freudian psychopathology was increasingly  
deployed in analysis of various aspects of the complex relationships between audio technologies, 
radiography and phonography, radio producers, distributers, administrators, regulators, 
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geographic constraints, material capacities, and audiences, relationships which were either too 
new or too unfamiliar, perhaps too far from the original pedagogical goals of the project, or 
perhaps simply too close to home for those involved, to be identified as anything but an 
overdetermination of audience and citizen, and as such would be subject to a meta-psychological 
analysis of a mass subjectivity enabled by networked communication devices. On the other hand, 
we will see in the case of Burris-Meyer that a somewhat distinct orientation to investigating the 
power of sound technologies to produce response nonetheless found a similarly overdetermined 
construction of audience and citizen, which he will resolve in favor of developing technology 
that would enable the mediatic control of mass corporeality so as to instrumentally determine the 
functional usefulness of the bodies so engaged. Ultimately for Adorno and for Eisler, such an 
overdetermination of audience and citizen would only be susceptible to dialectical method, 
whether in theory or practice. But dialectical method would neither be adequate in the face of the 
multiform complexities of the mediation of mass subjectivity and mass corporeality, nor will it 
sufficiently be able to resolve operations of mediation and mass culture generally in the face of 
the emergence of a new and specific status of listening and listening effects, now sustained 
within the virtual topography of networked media, folding out and over mediation as a merely 
material process.  This intensification from mediated material culture to networked virtuality, 
barely incipient through practices of listening, and harder to see in the mass culture of the motion 
picture, would have been the determining development to be grasped by studies of listening, not 
simply an overdetermination of mass audience and citizen. This development remained opaque 
for all modes of critical thought put to work in the Rockefeller listening projects, whether the 
psychoanalysis-inflected Princeton Radio Research, the critical theory-oriented Film Music 
Project, or the mediatic yet pragmatic behaviorism of Burris-Meyer‟s sound control systems. 
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However, what that shift meant for listening was clear to many of the persons involved.  
Between 1934 and 1941, listening had ceased being merely a crisis for democracy at the national 
level but had become a matter of national security in a global war.  Brecht‟s “little radio” indeed 
had gigantic reach. 
 
ii. The Princeton Radio Research Project In Its Early Stages 
 
The Princeton Radio Project was developed in the event of the convergence of a proposal 
by Dr. Hadley Cantril (a Harvard trained psychologist then an assistant professor at Columbia 
Teacher‟s College with an impending appointment in the Psychology Department of Princeton), 
and Rockefeller Foundation participation in a federal study of the increasingly hard to neglect 
cultural influence of radio broadcasting. Cantril presented a preliminary proposal to John 
Marshall in May 1936 after a conversation with Marshall on the subject.  This preliminary 
proposal laid out significant principles and motivations for the revised proposal which would 
ultimately be funded.  The primary motivation cited was that which Marshall would cite in the 
policy presentation two years later (cited in Part 2, “Policies for Enlightenment, Programs for 
Listening”, above), and which was broadly in line with the Trustees directive of 1934, now 
increasingly specific: the question mark of the public interest in radio against what was 
considered the well-understood value for commercial radio interests.  On May 16, 1936 Cantril 
submitted his first proposal with the following rationale given for the study: 
 
“Whereas the commercial sponsor is concerned chiefly with sales and is satisfied with a rough quantitative 
statement of the value of his radio program in terms of sales-promotion, the individual interested in finding 
out the cultural value and listener reactions to a given program is confronted with a much less definite task.  
He wants to know not only how many people listen, but why they listen and how the program is affecting 
them in their personal lives.”20 
 
                                                     
20 Princeton Radio 200 R 1936 1.1 200 Box 271 Folder 3233, “A Preliminary Study to Devise  a Method for Ascertaining the Effectiveness and 
the Effects of Radio programs of a Broad Cultural Nature”  1. 
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According to an interview with Marshall on October 19, 1936, Cantril‟s initial verbal 
proposals took issue with the studies to be undertaken by the Federal Radio Education 
Committee because he believed that their conceptualization of what would constitute educational 
radio to be too narrow.  Instead, Cantril proposed to study the radio audience more directly to see 
what they found educational, desired to learn, or needed help understanding.  He planned to use 
adapt and develop methodologies of public opinion analysis, market research, and social 
psychology.  Cantril mentioned CBS‟ assistant director for market research, Dr. Frank Stanton, 
formerly of Ohio State University, as a co-investigator on the project.  Rockefeller sponsorship 
was being solicited by a number of potential grant applicants similarly interested in ascertaining 
the interests of listeners without the commercial emphasis of industry listener studies. As it 
happened, the Town Hall of the Air radio forum and the Music League project funded by the 
Foundation had developed interest in such studies, and thus Cantril‟s suggestion had immediate 
relevance.
 21
 
 In a follow-up interview of Frank Stanton, John Marshall learned that Stanton‟s research 
at Ohio State and CBS had found that radio listeners‟ habits were determined more by program 
than by signal strength. This was clearly a key insight, and part of the CBS testimony to the FCC 
on radio frequency allocation.  Yet CBS had turned down further studies, which apparently were 
considered by Marshall “ahead of their time.”  Here again, market research, public opinion polls, 
and social psychological methods were considered the latest and most dependable methods.  
Whatever form the project would take, Marshall and Stanton both agree here with Cantril‟s 
concerns about too narrow a determination of what might constitute educational programming.  
                                                     
21 200 R Radio 1949 RG 1.1 Series 200 Box 271 Folder 3233, interview of Hadley Cantril by John Marshall at Princeton University, 10/19/36; 
John Marshall telephone interview of Cantril 11/3/36. 
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The task would be to determine “what interest programs of known appeal have for listeners, and 
further, so far as possible, what the individual basis of those interests is.”22 
 On the basis of the broad relevance of these discussions, Cantril re-submitted a grant 
proposal, dated December 31, 1936, asking for approximately $60,000 ($10,000 more than the 
previous proposal and conversations had suggested) for a two-year study of radio listeners‟ 
interests and motivations, with determinants being age, sex, vocation, and class: “The specific 
role which radio now plays in the life of the farmer and city dweller should be compared.”23  In 
correspondence dated 1/9/1937, Marshall informs Cantril that he is likely to be appointed to a 
committee that will review the 16 projects set up under the Federal Radio Education Committee 
– “For it was more or less agreed at a conference in Washington yesterday that some of the 
outcomes aimed at in the FREC‟s list of projects might well result from studies undertaken 
outside the committee.”  In essence, Cantril‟s study is seen as possibly accomplishing some of  
the goals being sought from these other Federal projects, and so he is being asked to review 
them.
24
  As a result of Cantril‟s participation in these Federal meetings, an interview 2/2/37 
between Marshall, Cantril, and Levering Tyson of the Council on Radio in Education indicates, 
Cantril will re-formulate his project.  He will refrain from attempting broadcasts as 
demonstrations of what a first-class educational program for radio would be; the more relevant 
matters are ascertaining listener‟s interests, understanding the values of current broadcasting, and 
making broad studies of radio‟s capacity for public service. Of these, Cantril would apparently 
concentrate on listener‟s interests and data collection and interpretation techniques regarding 
them,
25
 with FREC Project 15 ultimately reformulated as Project 1 but proposed otherwise 
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according to Cantril‟s design with this narrower set of activities foreseen.26 Thus, the dimension 
of demonstration or praxis has disappeared from his first proposal, and the need for investigative 
frameworks and hermeneutic procedures has correspondingly increased. Tyson recommends the 
project,
27
 as it positions a study FREC wanted to see carried out in a well-funded position in a 
productive and presumably supportive academic setting. The Foundation grants the proposal, but 
Frank Stanton of CBS declines the offer of a co-directorship. Instead, he comes on as associate 
director at a smaller salary.  
Cantril proposed a project which first and foremost would develop techniques for 
gathering data which would help ascertain listening motivation for radio programs of educational 
value, with an explicit view that commercial radio whether formulated according to curricular 
concerns generally performed pedagogical  functions, whether acknowledged or not by 
commercial broadcasters. Such data would ultimately be gleaned from existing commercial 
studies as well as from new studies to be undertaken, but in any case, the paramount aim was that 
of developing methodological innovation sufficient to understanding the mass cultures of 
listening.  The data would help determine: 
the attitudes of representative listeners to the programs studied, the reasons why such programs are liked or 
disliked, the influences of such programs on the personalities and opinions of the listeners, some practical 
suggestions for the improvement of such broadcasts, and some theoretical clues regarding the nature of 
radio as a psychological novelty in our present culture.
28
 
 
Radio was no longer a novel technological development in mass media culture, but a 
novel psychological one, and the project responded to concerns that its commercial value had 
outweighed other determinations of its use; this project would help determine policy-driven 
educational uses of radio.  It‟s important to notice the emphasis on the “personality” of 
“representative listeners” here.  Initially, data would be gathered through questionnaire-based 
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interviews of elementary school teachers and students.  While the initial grant budget requested 
funds merely for data gathering, an attached project description indicates that next steps included 
designing radio programs based on the insights gained through the reception studies, including 
broadcast of these programs “directly to school children in the New York area”29 with follow-up 
questionnaires to provide a control for measuring the effective improvement achieved.  What 
kind of information would be learned? Areas determined as key for producing quality 
educational radio included children‟s preferences for distinct types of programming, the 
relevance of age difference for such preferences, the roles of fantasy and imagery in children‟s 
appreciation of radio content, the size of the optimum group for classroom radio reception (the 
correlation, in other words, between matching the mass audience with classroom or auditorium 
size), the degree to which “active listening” would be desirable in the classroom, the ability of 
children to retain information delivered through radiophony in comparison to teaching and 
reading: the study aimed at questions of individual and group “psychology” articulated in terms 
of the value of direct participation with material remotely delivered in auditory form.
30
  The 
survey of questions began “What kind of radio programs do you like to hear in your school?” 
with possible answers being dramatized stories, “dramalogues” based on famous lives, foreign 
programming, accounts of historical events by eyewitnesses, talks by well-known figures, 
“musical programs with songs for you to sing,” accounts of a child‟s travels around the world, 
music appreciation programs, news, and sports.  Subsequent questions would then provide data 
according to which preferences for these programming types might be clarified, along with 
quality guidelines.
31
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The ultimately revised and successful proposal would not only jettison the explicitly 
educational goals of Cantril‟s preliminary proposal (presumably, such a project would not fall 
into the domain of Rockefeller Foundation Humanities program, but rather fall within the 
jurisdiction of the General Education Board) and instead, expand on the methodological 
dimension and the question of broad cultural effects to make data gathering among the general 
population the focus of innovation.  Cantril‟s appointment at Princeton ultimately placed him in 
that institution‟s School of Public and International Affairs, perhaps prompting, but in any case 
complementary with, an expanded research focus for the project, from regional, elementary 
education to matters considered of greater long-term importance for national media culture, and 
so, reflecting the rising importance of group psychology for studies of mass culture as public 
affairs  (Cantril was, as mentioned above, a trained psychologist and had already co-authored 
with G. W. Allport a volume entitled The Psychology of Listening,  published by Harpers in 
1935). Cantril was encouraged by the Foundation to enlist industry colleagues such as Stanton, 
forwarded for co-directorship of the Project, helping consolidate the project‟s capacity to receive 
industry cooperation in development as well as to achieve actual effects in industrial practice.
32
  
Further, the proposal‟s development was organized with Rockefeller direction to dovetail with 
the research program of the Federal Radio Education Committee, bringing the researchers‟ 
academic and industrial goals and capacities in line with high level federal interest in radio at the 
national level.
33
 Reformulations of the proposal in detail, then, were aimed at radio as a 
democratic instrument” and the inevitable contradiction between broadcast and all manner of 
distinct interests on the part of the public.  “Studies of age, sex, vocational, and class differences 
are needed.  The specific role which radio now plays in the life of the farmer and the city dweller 
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should be compared.”  Cooperation with Gallup‟s American Institute of Public Opinion was 
foreseen as a possibility once the initial studies had been completed, and Gallup enthusiastically 
recommended the project for approval.
34
  
In line with the larger goals of the funded study, Cantril outlined the potential for the 
radio study to address the observed conflicts between the public interest and the commercial 
domination of mass media cultures across the board. Cantril outlined an extensive set of 
problems not simply arising from the conflicting aims of listeners and broadcasters but more 
fundamentally what was seen as the determining power on public opinion and behavior of mass 
media.  That is, what Adorno would call the “ideological” function of radio was observed by 
participants generally and characterized less theoretically as an “inadequacy” that could be 
remedied by innovations in research, programming, and policy initiatives. Cantril submitted to 
the Foundation a statement which, because of its interest in elementary school education, appears 
to date from the his earlier conceptualization of the Radio Project as a research initiative aimed at 
understanding the use of radio in elementary schools. In this statement, “Inadequacy of 
Information as Furnished by the Newspaper, the Radio, and the Movies,” Cantril commented 
notably that content presented in the mass media was: routinely presented out of context; was 
formulated to reflect political positions specific to one outlet or another (problematic precisely 
because most receivers would tend not to read, view, or listen to a variety of sources reporting on 
the same events, and thus could not be expected to achieve objective viewpoints as a practice of 
reception); false “dangers and scares” were “played up” such as Russian communism; aimed at 
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emotional excitement over informative content; omitted information that would broach cultural 
taboos or might conceivably cause unrest; failed to explain motivation and causality in reporting; 
limited debate to only two opposing views to the detriment of more complex accounts.   
Cantril presented this summary by emphasizing a cross-media comparison.  Print news 
aimed at local readers, overemphasizing less important regional events to the detriment of 
international news, and more broadly neglected higher-level conceptual discussions of “ideas” in 
favor of news of isolated events.  Radio neglected possibilities for artistic innovations in 
entertainment, music, and drama in order to ensure commercial viability, and also failed to 
provide adequate programming for the diverse interests of its constituencies. Radio also failed to 
program varieties of programming according to a consistent allocation of frequencies for ease of 
listener use.  The motion picture industry avoided realistic content for fear of public offense; 
offered only unchallenging human interest stories instead of “progressive” programming that 
would have “social value.”  In addition, motion pictures were seen as overly interested in 
internationally successful products to the detriment of films addressing local problems.  In 
essence, radio, with its diversity of programming types ranging from news to drama to music, 
with abilities to distribute local as well as international material, was seen as operating with more 
of the technical and policy advantages of either print or motion pictures and fewer of their 
deficiencies.  Ultimately, commercial monopoly control of all the media was seen as the primary 
determinant in their inadequacy for social service whether for the categories Cantril lined out 
according to then contemporary standards: information, arts, or entertainment.   
But going along with monopoly control was that problem of “the psychology of the public.”  The 
alienation Marshall had noted between “aspiration” and “accomplishment” is cited here: 
“drabness and frustration in lives of people impel them to seek escape in emotional world of 
40 
 
unreality” (4).  But further, education had failed to train people to seek real as opposed to 
“stereotypical” information about the world at large, and in Cantril‟s view the contemporary 
chaos of that larger world led people to seek simplistic explanations for causes and events, with 
radio and the press at fault in their providing of superficial accounts.  These concerns all seem to 
reflect an understanding of Adorno and Horkheimer‟s views on mass culture. And there appears, 
though, perhaps a Heideggerian inflection here as well: the demands for specialization in the 
production of knowledge means that we are unable to verify knowledge personally.  “He” who 
speaks seems to be a Heideggerian “they”35:  
The expert opinion for the man on the street on topics he does not know about is not necessarily that of the 
scientist or scholar, but the popular writer who talks the layman‟s language, and becomes his authority.36 
 
Compartmentalization of contemporary popular thought meant that people all too easily 
accepted nonsense as information.  Again, the problem lies in the nature of contemporary 
collectivity expressed as mass media listening:   
This lack of integrated thinking stems from the lack of integrated living in a society which is not rooted in a 
community way of life and has as yet evolved no substitute for the community way of living.
37
 
 
In light of this document, it appears that both Cantril and Marshall located the problem of 
mass media in its replacement for community traditions that had failed to keep pace with the 
cultures of mass mediation.  That “information” which Cantril refers to is understood here in a 
distinctive way.  Documents about inadequacy of information are not concerned with news 
reporting alone, but with the distribution of cultural material more broadly, whether narrative 
film or music.  On the one hand, what is to be studied in the Princeton Radio Project is the 
reception of a mass medium in the form of listening.  At the same time, since Cantril is 
comparing efficacy across the media, it‟s clear that the particular modality of listening itself was 
                                                     
35 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time (New York: Harper, 1926) citation/page; also, “The Age of the World Picture” on research organization 
and knowledge production 1938. 
36 Folder 3234, “Statement by Hadley Cantril: Inadequacy of Information as Furnished by the Newspaper, the Radio and the Movies,” undated 
but perhaps provided as part of the motivation for project funding.  
37 Ibid. 
41 
 
not the object of concern, but rather an overlooked yet substantial, and now accessible, form of 
mass media reception that would afford important insights for cultural, educational, commercial, 
and regulatory policy.  That is, whatever the medial form, the project proceeded from the belief 
that commodity control negatively impacted cultural material of diverse sorts, all of which were 
considered loosely as “information” or at least subject to an evaluative framework that would 
determine appropriate and authentic “information.”   
Information stands as a negative evaluative criterion here, and a more specific 
investigation of its inadequacies make might clear, and ameliorate, the absence of a greater 
understanding of how precisely a useful concept of the mass audience was positively or 
negatively overlaid on the presumed given of a national or international population.  This is a 
basic regulatory question, then, even if regulatory questions may not attempt to answer it today.  
Faced with the need to formulate a plan to produce this knowledge and given the broad 
institutional requirements for the production of such knowledge, Cantril tentatively proposed 
remedies including public or other alternative means of financing media ownership and 
production, calling for:  
1) accompanying analysis of the effects such alternatives might have on programming 
2) study of propagandistic and educational uses of the media  
3) determination of the degree to which media programming satisfied consumer needs 
and desires 
4) analysis of consumer attitudes of the media.  In effect, what he calls for are cultural 
studies of a “public” understood to conflate or at perhaps collapse the identities and 
functions of both “audience” and “citizen,” to be broken down in terms of vocation, sex, 
age, and regional and national identity.   
42 
 
This conceptual determination, as I have suggested above, takes its ground in the 
instrumental power attributed to the mass media to produce quasi-behavioral effects in the 
listening audience – “habits and attitudes” that might be corrected by proceeding towards a 
pedagogy of mass media, regardless of the type of content concerned.  Thus, rather than asking 
questions specific to drama, literature, language, news, or music, all the study‟s research 
subdivisions were oriented around the problem of listening, thus unifying the applicability of the 
study for the radically dissimilar content of news delivery (also accomplished by print) together 
with the properly aesthetic (and emotional) functions of drama, narrative, and music.  This 
emphasis, prompted by the undeniable rise of radio‟s influence, meant that news, literature, radio 
drama, and music were to be studied under a common framework that broadly placed the 
importance of the mass media ultimately as a question of the potency or the fragility of American 
democracy and its mechanisms. In a new age in which network media, audiovisual virtuality 
(with the impending rise of television well understood) threatened to displace the print literacy 
that had been considered fundamental  to democratic institutions, studies of listening were to be a 
way of producing a new, urgently needed understanding of the voice of America. 
In its final formulation, the project would carry out, according to Marshall‟s later summary: 
1) study of the characteristics of radio stations and programs on which listener interest 
seemed to depend 
2) studies of the characteristics of listeners attracted by programs of different types 
3) study of news broadcasting 
4) study of broadcast music (this portion would be assigned to Adorno for a short period) 
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5) studies of the varied stimuli radio offered listeners in rural areas or during a political 
campaign.
38
 
According to the grant review, the project received $67,000 total over 2 years (although 
this figure would be supplemented several times for additional specific studies and preparation of 
meetings and documents in advance of its review), “towards a study to be made in the School of 
Public and International Affairs of the value of radio to listeners ….”  On the relation of the grant 
to the Foundation‟s interest in the Humanities, the grant action states that understanding the 
value of radio to listeners is “fundamental for the success of the co-operative efforts of the radio 
industry and non-commercial agencies that are directed towards broadening radio‟s range of 
public service.” The context for the grant is cited as that of previous, smaller studies such as the 
National Music League work and the like, in which foundation funds had been used previously 
for specific inquiries into listener response. This grant thus considerably expands interests that 
the Foundation had placed as central previously, presumably since the 1934 directive from 
trustees. The premise:   
Radio has developed because it has satisfied genuine human needs.  But how precisely it meets those needs 
is still an open question, and a very important one if the medium is to develop the greatest good for the 
greatest number. 
 
The proposal accordingly outlines a study designed to answer the basic question, what role does radio play 
in the lives of listeners?  Answering this question, it points out, first involves gathering evidence not at  
present available on a number of subsidiary questions: who listens? Where and when does listening take 
place?  What is listened to?  Why and how people listen?  And finally, what are the effects of listening?  Of 
the four years the proposed study will require, the first two will be devoted to developing and testing 
techniques by which evidence needed to answer these questions can be secured.  In the last two years these 
techniques will be put to use in gathering such evidence from a representative sample of the total 
population.
39
 
 
In language reflecting Cantril‟s original proposal, the Foundation stated its concerns that 
although radio was licensed by the government in the “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity, the industry‟s research has as yet been almost exclusively concerned with the listener 
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as a prospective purchaser.” That is, some of the questions the study wanted to answer had been 
asked, but from the perspective of recruiting consumers.  The radio industry was seen as – in fact 
admitted to being – unwilling to risk the investment of any broader inquiry. The plans for the 
study are noted as having been drawn up by Frank Stanton of CBS‟s Market Research Division 
and Prof. Hadley Cantril of Princeton.
 40
  The proposal was reviewed by an informal committee 
of three educators and three broadcasters representing NBC, CBS, and NAB.  The project is  
scheduled for evaluation after the first two years to determine continuance.  Findings are 
expected to be widely influential.
41
 
The project, in any case, had already grown larger, being granted almost $20,000 over the 
initial amount Cantril had requested a year earlier. But Cantril, as a new faculty member at 
Princeton, was also occupied with research interests of his own as well as carrying out teaching 
responsibilities.  After receiving funding for the project, Cantril, with notice to John Marshall, 
hired Dr. Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, an Austrian émigré specializing in social psychologies of radio, 
and appointed him to a research post at Princeton in order to direct the day-to-day activities and 
research agenda of the project.  Where Cantril‟s initial proposal for studying the uses of radio for 
elementary school education suggested that outcomes would be detailed in a written report, the 
successfully-funded study as it evolved under Lazarsfeld would aim to produce an entire 
academic series of book-length reports establishing an entire toolbox of research methods for an 
emergent field of radio reception studies addressing all aspects of the form. Considerations 
developed over the course of the project ranged from studies of competition between print and 
radio reception (motivated by the concern that radio as an undemocratic medium would replace 
the more “rational” medium of print and undermine literacy more generally), to the newly 
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developed authority role seen to be occupied by the newscaster, to the mass hysteria surrounding 
Welles‟ broadcast of War of the Worlds, and important for my purposes here, Adorno‟s thesis of 
“regressive listening.” 
 
iii. The Project Under Lazarsfeld  
 
200 R Radio 1949 RG 1.1 Series 200 Box 271 Folder 3234 
 
Paul Felix Lazarsfeld was asked to take on the directorship of the study when Frank Stanton 
received a salary raise that was beyond competitive from CBS and so declined the position of 
director.  A friend of Cantril, before emigration, Lazarsfeld had been posted at the University of 
Vienna. When he joined the radio study, Lazarsfeld was with the University of Newark in New 
Jersey. Both Gallup and Lynd agreed with Cantril that he would be the next likely candidate after 
Stanton, and his acceptance was a great relief to Cantril, who with full-time departmental duties 
would not be able to direct the project in its day-to-day activities.
42
  In a letter dated September 
22, 1937, Poole tells JM he will name Lazarsfeld a Research Associate at Princeton.  He notes 
that with Stanton still on as an associate director, the project seems “top heavy” but that with this 
kind of project aimed at the development of new methodological tools, the amount of expert 
advice involved will be beneficial.  The budget is re-aligned to allow focused study in the first 
quarter, and to allow for the change in staff.  Lazarsfeld gets $7,500, meaning that one research 
assistant has been permanently cut, originally to offer Stanton more money, and finally to have 
him as an assistant director along with Lazarsfeld.  
The project begins to take on a larger cast.  Marshall suggests cooperation with Raymond 
Franzen, the recipient of the Foundation grant for a listener study at the National Music League. 
For his part, Lazarsfeld introduces psychoanalytic theory into the project on a more significant 
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basis than Cantril had, inviting Erich Fromm to address a research meeting of specialists in 
psychoanalysis to discuss the project.  
“Dear Mr. Marshall: 
 
The psycho-analysts, in accepting our invitation for Sunday, December 12, pointed out discreetly that the 
relation between an honorarium of twenty dollars and work all afternoon and evening is not quite what they 
are accustomed to.  I didn‟t feel like spending any more money on a venture the value of which we do not 
yet know.  Therefore, after some deliberation back and forth, we changed the plans in the following way: 
We will start with dinner at six o‟clock at the Faculty Club of Columbia to get acquainted and the talk of 
Dr. Fromm and the discussion will take place all evening.  We shall, therefore, expect you for dinner at six 
o‟clock.” 43 
 
But consultations also occurred with social psychologist Dr. Mark May,
44
 director of Yale‟s 
Institute of Human Relations, and that institute‟s Dr. John Dollard, at work on a 
conceptualization of criteria for considering “life history” as the interstice between culture and 
personality.
45
 Such qualitative concepts as “life history” perhaps would have been of interest for 
their potential explanatory value in the project‟s interpretation of quantitative survey results.  
Such figures as anthropologist Edward Sapir were also considered for participation in the project, 
but Sapir was unavailable at the time.
46
  In addition to the National Music League, Marshall 
coordinated contacts between the Princeton researchers and the League for Political Education, 
whose American Town Hall broadcasters were also interested in listeners‟ attitudes.47 
 The project was as successful as its methodologies and orientation were confused under 
Lazarsfeld‟s leadership, which apparently pushed for a stronger psychoanalytic and 
psychological orientation.  In an interview on 10/19/37, Lazarsfeld explains to Marshall that the 
central question of the project, in his view, is motivation, that is, “why do people listen.”  
However, a letter dated the same day from George Denny of the League for Political Education 
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informs Marshall that Denny has congratulated Cantril on the establishment of his “Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis,” and while he doesn‟t know exactly what Cantril has in mind, he offers 
Cantril the use of America‟s Town Meeting of the Air” as a research project while it is in 
progress. Some months later, John Marshall refers Lazarsfeld to another Foundation-funded 
project on the leisure activities whose results were printed by the National Recreation 
Association; the grantee of that project had been chairman of a Foundation committee engaged in 
the study of leisure time.
 48
 
 Nonetheless, further funding was forthcoming for smaller projects which fit easily into 
the loosely-oriented umbrella of Princeton Radio Research.  The team, at the request of Marshall 
and with a total of $1400.00 in additional funding provided, undertook a confidential report on 
shortwave radio station WIXAL in Boston.  Lazarsfeld assigned Marjorie Fleiss, who produced 
the questionnaire used in the listener survey that would be presented to Trustees at the April 
1938 meeting as part of the report by the World Wide Broadcasting Foundation.  Fleiss was a 
graduate of Cornell‟s program in undergraduate psychology, and had previous work experience 
with Gallup‟s polling organization and market research firms, among others.49  Fleiss‟ 
questionnaire asked questions that would gather information as to technical reception of short 
wave radio reception versus broadcast as well as, for example, the accomplishment listeners 
were most proud of in their own lives, aimed at understanding the gap between aspiration and 
accomplishment that was used to characterize the networked audience-as-public. The 
questionnaires would be interpreted for motivation but only on the basis of data that identified 
interest group (sex, class, age, hobby, automobile ownership, most admired person, favored 
charitable organizations, etc.)  The importance of the WIXAL study was not only in extending 
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Princeton Radio‟s reach to narrow-cast short wave as well as standard broadcast, but in 
producing this small study for the World Wide Broadcasting Foundation as a model for a short 
wave study to be carried out in Britain on a larger basis by a Rockefeller Foundation staffer at 
the BBC, Lloyd A. Free, who would serve as review secretary for Princeton Radio in 1939, but 
at this time was studying at the BBC‟s Staff College.50 
 Within this mixture informed by various strains of market research, Freudian, Jungian, 
social, and behavioral psychology, and propaganda analysis, (propagandists such as Denny) the 
first mention of Adorno in Princeton Radio Research documents comes in a letter from 
Lazarsfeld to Marshall, which informs him that Adorno as “the musical expert on our staff” has 
been reviewing materials related to listener survey responses.  Apparently the National Music 
League study headed by Franzen only was able to produce raw data, which was given to 
Princeton Radio to analyze at Marshall‟s request.51  Adorno‟s participation in the project started, 
it seems, as an analyst of survey material, and his charge, under Lazarsfeld, would have been to 
assist in interpreting the data in terms of “listening motivation.”  (Max Horkheimer arranged for 
Adorno to come to New York to accept this position with Lazarsfeld in early 1938, according to 
Martin Jay, and it was not at all what he expected.)
52
 
 Two documents in general indicate the combination of psychoanalytically inflected social 
theory and Frankfurt School critical theory as applied procedure.  First, in a presentation at 
Columbia in spring 1938, Lazarsfeld suggested that they were attempting to understand what was 
an admittedly very broad topic but one which became tractable from the orientation of 
psychological studies of listening: “You see there is a general agreement that the radio should be 
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studied as it is now and that it should be studied from the listeners‟ angle and under 
psychological aspects.  Perhaps one more wording taken from another document might be the 
most helpful one: we are supposed to study who listens to what, why, and with what effect.”53  
Clearly, we are far from Cantril‟s much more expansive questions regarding listening first 
outlined in 1936; moreover, Marshall‟s six categories of listening had been reduced to four here, 
with motivation the central lever between subject, object, broadcast technology, and mass 
cultural effect.  Reflecting the concerns of pseudo-individuation Adorno had taken up in “Fetish 
Character in Music and Regression in Listening,” Lazarsfeld states that while progressive goals 
of radio education are desirable, much theoretical and conceptual work is required at the outset 
of any such program.   
People in big cities are isolated and radio should help them to a feeling of social participation.  But if the 
man plays in his home with an invisible orchestra, if he carves wood according to the instructions of a radio 
course, might we not induce him to pseudo activities which make him drift still farther way (sic) from 
organized living with other people?  I don‟t pretend to condemn those efforts without father study; I just 
want to show that much arm-chair thinking is necessary if we do not want to plunge good-naturedly into a 
stream of promotional activities which might lead to very different ends than they seemed to at the 
beginning.
54
 
 
Invisible orchestras and all, radio made everything appear differently:  
As the project proceeds, we are more and more impressed by the necessity of re-examining all sorts of 
educational and cultural ideas just because, when confronted with the radio, these ideas exhibit unexpected 
facets.
55
 
 
Some of the unexpected findings were the commercial radio industry‟s massive compilation of 
statistics on radio listening and program appeal, a comprehensive body of data of which most 
academics were, according to Lazarsfeld, unaware.  Lazarsfeld points to an important fact about 
Princeton Radio: while they did gather data, much of what the project actually produced was 
analysis of data gathered elsewhere.  As Marshall‟s referring of other projects‟ data to 
Lazarsfeld‟s team suggests, Princeton Radio‟s initial focus on methodology and theory was 
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partly organized so as, on the one hand, to develop theoretical tools for data that had already 
been collected elsewhere in addition to new data gathering techniques, or, on the other, to 
provide small studies when needed for the success of other projects already funded with fewer 
resources. The project functioned almost as a clearing house of theoretical ideas emerging from 
the contradictory if highly current formulation of radiophonic medium, broadcast message, and 
audience reception as listening according to which it had been conceived. Lazarsfeld also 
sketches out the breadth of importance of listening:   
It is clear, for instance, that those occupational groups which, according to general statistics, have less 
schooling might be more affected by a medium of information which depends on listening only; the farmer 
and the industrial worker are among those who require our special attention.  There are also certain fields 
where radio has grown to more than average importance because it offered new opportunities.  Just think of 
radio in politics, of the role of the news commentator and news bulletins and of the enormous share which 
music has in the total volume of programs.   
 
Lazarsfeld mentions here also the need to develop new techniques as well as his plans for 
publications.  Academics will be able to get up to speed on radio listening through a series of 
five monographs on each of the areas mentioned in his talk.  Where FREC had forced Cantril to 
give up the notion of demonstrating lessons learned by producing new radio shows and testing 
the response, Lazarsfeld hopes also to provide a source of radio instruction: in the form of a 
textbook.   Already, he has preliminary conclusions as to one medium, specifically radio, which 
should be addressed in order to be effective: repetition.   
What deserves our special attention is the program series, the stimulus being repeated one or more times a 
week for perhaps many years.  To study the effect of such a phenomenon you must retain the same group of 
people much longer under observation than is usually done in research experiments. We concentrate the 
corresponding problems into special studies of radio panels.
56
 
 
This medium, in order to promote community, democracy, and education, can not directly 
involve the participation of the audience, though, in determining program content.  A 
“mechanistic” vote on what should be broadcast would be “disastrous” since the public‟s taste is 
already perverted by bad programming.  Here, again, there is a point of comparison with Adorno:   
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[…T]his taste is the perverted effect of a steady injection of bad programs which doesn‟t permit the 
development of better taste in spite of the remarkable program achievements which broadcasters can point 
to from time to time.  But we have little actual evidence so far that if people knew about better programs, 
they would like them.  Here is a great challenge to research.  We have to develop techniques to test and, if 
possible, to prove the educability of the listener, his willingness to prefer better offerings if he is given a 
fair chance.  The problem of educability of tastes will be studied in the light of special efforts of some 
programs and stations.  In a later phase of the Princeton Project, it will come more and more to the center of 
our attention.
57
 
 
Concluding, Lazarsfeld and his team 
are more impressed as we go on by how much the social problems of our times are reflected in the 
problems of radio research.  We do not want to decide the question of whether a conservative board of 
education in a small town is a better program guide than a modern business company in New York, but will 
have to show how the problems of insecurity and lack of direction characteristic of our social life affect 
radio just as they do any other institution irrespective of its administration.
58
 
 
Here, critical theory and psychoanalytic explanation are invoked to produce what was perhaps an 
unexpected critique of institutions and administrations which relied on a founding analytics of 
“corrupted taste” to resist expanding the participatory nature of the medium or the political 
capacity for producing social effects that the medium presumably had demonstrated; these 
concerns were primarily observed in terms of radio listening as a symptom, the details of its 
consumption derived from data collection the account of the listening public as patient, such that 
individual disorders could be transposed to mass ones: the mass totality of radio listening 
reproduced anxiety as problems of insecurity, and distraction, a lack of direction.  The listener, 
as the overdetermined subject of distributed audience, listening consumer, and public citizen, 
listens passively and emotionally, in a state of alienation from her own individuation. 
Nonetheless, the general state of this passive condition is graspable precisely in the stasis 
produced in its refusal of audience participation or access to production, and can be interpreted 
for theoretical purposes, which will be then applied to strengthening the already demonstrable 
powerful aspects of radio, for example, repetition.   
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The result was that Lazarsfeld succeeded in identifying theoretical approaches having 
potential for informing practice, for instance, in seeing that repetition functioned as a long-term 
defining feature of the medium that made it amenable to critical analysis, much as Williams 
would later derive “flow” from Strindberg‟s drama and make “mobile flow” a dramaturgical 
characteristic of televisual form itself, allowing television analysis a more dynamic dimension 
than simply in terms of program “distribution,” and so extending the analysis of the medium 
from commodity form, to one of cultural form part of social, psychic life.
59
  The concept of radio 
listening in terms of “repetition,” even without being able to identify any particular receiver who 
was listening, allowed Lazarsfeld to call for extending research far beyond the durations of 
consumer listening than had at that time become the norm in radio studies.  Radio study meant an 
analysis of the medium as everyday life.  It is striking how well Princeton Radio understood 
what would become important questions for television research in this regard, but it is also 
important to understand Lazarsfeld‟s comments in light of the work that Adorno had done prior 
to joining the project and during his tenure with it.  “Pseudo activities,” repetition, taste, cultural 
production of states of mass subjectivity, mass media as instrumental forms through which those 
states of subjectivity were deployed – these were terms and concepts that formed the nexus of 
dialog between psychoanalytic social theory and critical theory.  As we will see, these terms 
point to the very different conclusions which Adorno and Lazarsfeld each would ultimately 
produce. 
 Not long after the Columbia talk, Lazarsfeld briefed his senior staff on the “role of „deep‟ 
psychology” in the project. The project‟s heavy use of subjective interview material was useful, 
though systematic analysis of such material was difficult at best, because from these interviews 
could be deduced “descriptions of psychological processes.”  In what appears to be either a 
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pragmatic framing or perhaps a reduction of Adorno‟s contributions, Lazarsfeld noted that the 
goal is indeed to arrive at generalizations but to be useful these statements have to be supported 
by interview material. 
[For example,] Dr. Wisengrund [sic, meaning Adorno] thinks that the less “emotional” a person‟s attitude 
toward music is, the more he knows about it. It is evident that even a few cases should prove or disprove 
such assumptions.  It would be worthwhile to conduct a systematic investigation as to where this kind of 
statement could be found in the different sections of the project. 
 
But this distancing of critical theoretical methods was also necessary in order to maintain 
a social psychological, not theoretical or clinical, method for the project, for in fact, radio 
listeners are never really considered as subjects under analysis in any strict sense; rather they are 
seen as informants in a process aiming at a different outcome altogether.  The analysis of effects 
was to be distinguished from describing personal experiences; general effects can be described, 
but can not be assumed to be the same for distinct individuals.  This suggests that understanding 
why people listen should be understood in terms of socially-based mechanisms of gratification, 
not intimate desires.  Gratification would be analyzed in terms of understanding the distinct 
motives people cited for tuning in, but also in terms of the effect of gratification produced 
through listening – and different people may be receiving different pleasures.  But this sort of 
analysis, too, soon begets another.  To get at the “deep stuff,” which would by definition be both 
social and unconscious, the interviewer needs to have a theory in place and elicit interview 
material that would prove or disprove such material.  Even a hesitancy to answer or an inflection 
of the voice may corroborate such a theory of gratification.    Extending this “reason analysis” 
would be the personality approach – situating the reasons in light of a broader account of the 
observed personality of the person.  Understanding radio listening in relation to the person‟s 
interests in the same objects obtained through other means may lead to a typology in which 
different personality types relate to different attitudes towards the radio.  Repetitive program 
54 
 
content, then, supplemented with timed data collection and personality type description, becomes 
the independent variable around which public psychology then fluctuates: a psycho-social 
production of a virtual public sphere determined in relation to program objects, in terms of which 
invariants the public, its orientations, and its emotional deficiencies becomes knowable. 
Beyond the level of personality analysis lay yet another, broader, and biochronological 
one: that of life history (as practiced by Yale‟s John Dollard, as indicated above).  Musical 
development or the development of political interests over the life of the individual became 
expanded indices to chart the person‟s interest or pleasure in listening to music or political 
programming.  Lazarsfeld describes this biographical layer as accounting for listening not only in 
terms of personality but in terms of the way personality has been “molded” such as could be 
found relevant for a radio study. Finally, the task is to lift these observations to a more 
systematic level.  Here, interviews should be planned to select for and anticipate the breakdown 
of material according to categories that explicate otherwise random patterns.  Thus, the project 
sought to identify groups of people which otherwise could not have been isolated on the basis of 
the known interests used to parameterize the studies themselves.  Instead of, for example, 
isolating an “interest” group such as class or gender interest group and proposing how such an 
interest would be reflected in terms of a social identity, with mechanisms of identification (with 
or against the subject‟s interests) operating in the production of gratification, here, the research 
was designed to produce studies which would make conclusions as to the:  
1) features of the programs  
2) influences brought to bear upon people  
3) tendencies, needs, and desires of listeners.
60
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Demographics were therefore integrated with taste.  (Today‟s “tagging media” take the opposite 
approach: objects are re-programmable; users “tag” media objects, allowing “media taste” rather 
than “personal desires” to become the object of exchange among media users, disentangling 
demographic from taste which, once formatted as program content, responding to personal needs 
and desires, which had remained in the radio study implied in the repetition of the program 
object. Now, explicit media self-publicity is entangled along with the tagged media object, 
producing the distinct configuration of a “participatory,” virtual public sphere.  Whereas in all 
the bioenergetic models of publics in these Rockefeller projects, unknown mass, audience 
“reaction” had to be somehow isolated and its meanings determined, now, a sustained turbulence 
of “participation” provides the bioinformatic data stream, itself meaningful in its own right 
regardless of whether symptoms of “distraction” or “insecurity” are the indicated “reactions”.) 
 On the one hand, it is clear that neither the largely visually-conceived mechanism of 
“dream screen or mirror stage” that would find, shortly, adaptations of both Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis for film and literary studies is in operation here.  On the other hand, it 
is also clear that the interview format itself is conceived as a listening activity attentive to 
hesitations in speech and inflections of voice, a method which can extend from superficial 
observation to plumb the depths of mass personality.  But interviews are neither talking cures nor 
collections of data that will become evidence of “cognition” but rather carefully categorized 
theoretical templates through which program features, social influences, and listener wants can 
lead to analytic propositions; and listeners are not patients but rather conductors of networked 
effects which are not ultimately reducible to individuals.  These are, after all, statistically-
intensive as well as qualitative studies, not autobiographies.  Rather, listeners were conceived as 
delayed interactors; the templates that were constructed to contain their input and indicate their 
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“moulding” over time would facilitate a more complete and efficient, but still, homeostatic 
feedback loop that was desired for the improved administration of mass broadcast media.  Mid-
twentieth century reception research concretized the development for “interactive media” as 
much as, if not more than, the two-way radio which Enzensburger (1974) believed had 
democratic potential for mass cultural mobilization, after Brecht‟s observations. In this context, 
though, the immediate aim of capturing input from radio listening was not participatory radio 
culture or any demonstration of such, so much as the output of that which was believed to be the 
most effective form of cultural literacy: not more efficient marketing, at least not right away, or 
some programmatic prototype, as would be the case in both Burris-Meyer‟s and Eisler‟s projects 
(and in many later software development projects), but a series of academic texts, which would 
shed light on the future of television as much as on the immediate broadcast needs for 
commercial radio with improved educational content. 
 In December, 1938, Hadley Cantril produced for a trustees meeting of the Foundation a 
draft of his study of the sensational October 30 radio broadcast that year by Orson Welles of 
H.G. Wells‟ The War of the Worlds. Welles‟ broadcast, like so many other contemporaneous 
developments, confirmed the Foundation‟s and the researchers‟ sense of the importance of the 
Princeton Radio Research Project.  Not only did the mass hysteria over a wide geographic area 
provide additional validation for their work, but CBS, presumably through Stanton, immediately 
requested a listener survey.  30 homes were visited to find out “Why They Listened.”61 
 Cantril‟s team found that eighteen out of thirty respondents had been “dragged into the 
situation” by excited listeners – in other words, that a majority of listeners had been convinced of 
the fictional drama‟s factuality simply by a hysterical minority.  Ten listeners found the program 
by chance dialing after it had begun, thus justifying perhaps their frightened reaction since they 
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had not heard the initial program disclaimer (although such a reaction still means that they were 
not paying attention to the intervening program announcements).  Two listeners had heard the 
entire broadcast, and in spite of hearing that the program was a Mercury Theatre play, became so 
frightened by the program content that they simply forgot the interim program identifications 
which they did in fact hear.  Cantril‟s report complicates motivation with understanding:  only 
four out of 30 listeners thought that the invasion was from Mars.  Others thought the invaders 
were animal monsters, German or Japanese armed forces, an attack on Jews in the manner of 
Kristalnacht in Germany, and four listeners simply understood something terrifying was 
happening but couldn‟t understand what it was. Ten listeners attempted to check the facts and on 
whatever basis found their fears corroborated; five listeners out of the thirty interviewed simply 
panicked.
62
 
Cantril attributed the realism achieved by the broadcast of War of the Worlds to the effect 
of the program‟s dramatization of two features: the sound of authority figures reacting to the 
fictional crisis, and the use of regional geographic features which listeners recognized: the sound 
of authoritative voices reacting to the event of some invasion of familiar locales was enough to 
incite panic.  For a distracted audience holding a range of potentially apocalyptic beliefs -- some 
of them well motivated, given U.S. anti-Semitism -- the program provided answers to anxieties 
of various stripes.  Finally, Cantril concluded, “incredible things become more acceptable when 
the narrator himself stresses their incredibility.”  As a result of this survey, Cantril received a 
$3000 grant from the General Education Board which ultimately led to the publication of a 
monograph on the subject.
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 The early productivity and success of Princeton Radio led to interest in a similar study on 
motion picture viewing audiences, interest in radio research projects focusing on propaganda, 
and a rising profile for the methods being developed, with possible extension being considered in 
service to Danish and Swiss broadcasting companies interested in reaching the American listener 
of their programs (presumably these studies would be addressed to Americans resident in 
Europe).
64
  From late 1938 preparations began for the project‟s two-year review in early 1939.  
The project was seen as initiating a new research discipline in applying social psychological 
methods to the medium of radio broadcasting in asking the question, “What is radio doing in 
society”? Additional monies were appropriated to expedite a review by a panel including Lyman 
Bryson, Columbia Teachers College, Columbia University, who would serve as chair; Douglas 
Waples, University of Chicago, School of Library Service; R. L. La Piere, Stanford University, 
social psychologist; Harold Laswell, listed as representing the William A. Whyte Foundation, 
social psychologist interested in public opinion, individual psychology; Gilbert Seldes of CBS, a 
“long-time serious critic of the „lively arts,‟ now one of CBS‟s top producers, and shortly to be 
responsible for CBS Television Service; James R. Angell, of NBC, with interests in educational 
broadcasting and experience in psychology; and Irvin Stewart, Committee on Scientific Aids for 
Learning, interested in broadcasting and former member of the FCC.  After hearing an 
introduction to the project presented by Lazarsfeld, Stanton, and Cantril, these panelists would 
pose questions to the directors who would then prepare written statements to be presented at the 
next meeting.  The committee also included Robert Lynd, Dept. of Social Sciences of Columbia; 
Davidson Taylor, Music Division CBS, and Lloyd A. Free, committee secretary (from the 
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Foundation).
65
  Typically, the production of academic policy texts was predicated on the 
conclusions which reflected mid-twentieth century projects in what we may call, after Latour, 
but with a rather different set of meanings attached, an early phase of “sociotechnical” research: 
concentrations on sub-national focus, that is, regional rather than national identities; institution 
building, implying the Foundation‟s role in building networks of institutions nationally; and the 
cultivation of public taste that would incorporate the ability to make discernments between truth 
and fiction, and with a lack of exposure to quality programming cited as the primary obstacle; 
experimental methods were developed in order to support these goals through information 
gathering and statistical studies.
66
 
 With Adorno joining the project no later than May 1939, Hadley Cantril proposed a 
shortwave radio project that would capture and transcribe foreign broadcasts, now seen as a 
possible form of foreign military or political influence that might interfere with the upcoming 
presidential election.  Adorno was charged with the “theoretical side” of the project, which 
gained urgency with Hitler‟s invasion of Poland in that year.  Lazarsfeld, surprised at the 
invasion, having believed that Hitler would focus on economic development, suggested that 
Adorno‟s work on the radio music research was very closely aligned with Marshall‟s thinking on 
radio research, serving the need to join “general theory, speculation and developmental 
concepts” with outcomes.  Lazarsfeld had expressed the need to better respond to political 
developments; not expecting war, he felt he had missed opportunities for demonstrating the 
utility of the techniques the researchers were developing.  In a letter dated September 21, 1939, 
he wrote to Marshall, “Now along comes the war and I miss another chance to show the 
usefulness of our technique, and so the dilemma between methods and results, under which the 
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Project is suffering, continues.” Presumably Adorno‟s participation would help with a critical 
and conceptual framework to join “methods” and “results.” “Listener Research Techniques” 
developed thereafter included: 
Methodologies: “Program-Station Audience Measurements:  Mail response (in/out); telephone interviews 
(in/out) personal contact; questionnaires; automatic recording device (basis for Nielsen Radio Index); panel 
technique; special methods (i.e., measuring power consumption at central points, or polling radio editors, 
etc.” 
 
The documents continue with the “advantages and disadvantages” of the automatic recording 
device developed for the project: 
“Uses: size of audience; geographical distribution of audiences; composition of audience by socio-
economic strata; audience turnover data (is the audience tuning to station or to program?); partial listening 
data; set usage and program exposure related to other family activities 
 
Advantages: sampling, can be controlled by age, sex, education, occupation, socio-economic group, 
population levels, and land area; eliminates faulty memory on part of respondents; fairly accurate economic 
status, sex, age, etc. observations made at time of installation; best measure of audience turnover; best 
measure of partial listening (separable measurements); provides information over long periods of time; 
includes data on programs broadcast at all hours (when researchers aren‟t working, for example); results 
are not influenced by one member of the family; interview bias doesn‟t exist; minimum of respondent‟s 
time used. 
 
Disadvantages: expensive initial cost (given what it returns, is economical in terms of program units); is 
slow; records operation, not listening; no opinions or activities recorded unless questionnaire is also used; 
possible interruptions of mechanism; higher chance of refusals, and so possibly unrepresentative 
sampling.” 
 
Additional revisions given in “Listener Research Techniques Part Two – Station Coverage 
Measurements” included methods for determining “station coverage” included “incoming mail 
[in response to prize or gift], outgoing mail [questionnaire], personal interview, automatic 
recorder”  
The automatic recording “device” engineered for the project had the advantages of “1 
regular use of the station can be defined; 2. Concept of coverage can be broadened to include not 
only the number of listeners to the station but also the actual amount of time each family spends 
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listening to the station,” but disadvantages not only of cost per unit, but the inability to track 
actual listening, only radio set operation.
 67
  
The user-specificity supplied in later interactive network technologies applied to mass 
media use, then, was a long-noticed need stemming from the radio research project device‟s  
“automatic” operation.  Meanwhile, Adorno provided John Marshall a copy of his “Husserl and 
the Problem of Idealism,” for which Marshall thanked Adorno in January 1940, not indicating 
whether he actually read it, or if so, what he thought of it.  Shortly afterward, through CBS, 
Lazarsfeld was selected for an award for his contributions to radio advertising, through his 
research revealing how to interpret the “educational significance” and other “social aspects of 
radio in terms of economic pertinence to the commercial use of the medium.”68  Plans for 
publication of the research, in 11 projected volumes, followed.  Virgil Thompson‟s article in the 
New York Herald Tribune on “How Popular Music Works” was noted by the project, which 
Lazarsfeld moved to Columbia University in 1940.  Adorno also took up interest in jitterbugging 
as gesture, thus, the sole explicit indicator of theoretical interests in music and racial identity 
among the theoretical contributors to the project, although, of course, Adorno did not analyze 
jitterbugging solely in terms of raced dance. 
 
Chapter 4 
Harold Burris-Meyer’s Theatres of Sound: Sound Control of Music Across Borders 
 
After previous efforts between 1931 and 1938 in developing the “dramatic use of 
controlled sound” in the theatre, in 1938, theatrical designer and sound engineer Harold Burris-
Meyer began a series of successful grant applications for his work in electronic sound processing 
for live theater.  Whereas the Princeton Radio Project concentrated on broadcast listening, with 
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music considered as a primary form of program content, Burris-Meyer‟s sound project, whose 
aims were to develop sound processing techniques for dramatic effects, made music much more 
of an explicit concern, although not in any conventional way, and always as what seems to be the 
most compelling means for evoking audience response, that is, as a broadly powerful notion of 
technicized expression.  Competitors in the area of developing sound effects included Orson 
Welles, in his production of Julius Caesar, and Leopold Stokowski, in his musical radio 
broadcasts; in comparison, Burris-Meyer was considered by some Rockefeller Foundation 
reviewers as comparatively naïve in acoustic knowledge; however, his work in sound design for 
the “Living Newspaper” theatrical documentaries presented at the Federal Theater swayed John 
Marshall. (In the Soviet context, Prokofiev had earlier experimented with montage effects in 
musical composition, and at roughly this point in time was developing musical sound effects for 
Nevsky; earlier, Brecht and his collaborators at the Baden-Baden festival had experimented with 
the live, synchronized montage of wireless broadcast, separation of instrumentalists and 
vocalists, and cinema projection in the site of reception to depict, among other examples, 
Lindbergh as man-machine pilot in 1929.)
69
  
Burris-Meyer‟s “principles of sound control” were already implemented in a theatre 
design at Oberlin College, as well as at the Paper Mill Playhouse in Milburn, New Jersey, with 
support from Bell Laboratories; he had also worked with RCA engineers on developing sound 
for television broadcast by the time of his first Rockefeller Foundation grant.  Based on a first, 
successful $500 grant-in-aid, a $30,000 grant was approved on June 9, 1939 to the Hoboken, NJ, 
Stevens Institute of Technology (SIT) for “research in the control of sound and light for dramatic 
purposes during three years beginning July 1, 1939, $12,000 to be the maximum amount 
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available in any one year of the period.”70 In his thank you note of December 14, 1938, BM 
notes that he is “dilapidated” as a result of working on too many productions.  But “I shall 
however be able to devote some time to bringing the sound picture into focus during the 
Christmas recess.”  Burris-Meyer‟s research would not only develop electronic filters to process 
vocal sound, but synchronize it correctly in live performance; in effect, this synchronized 
performance space, capable of timed, processed effects in sound and light, would later lead to 
sound engineering for theaters of war during World War II. Burris-Meyer‟s work would also 
benefit the Muzak Corporation, providing expertise in balancing sound levels between 
loudspeakers for both administrative announcements and music, and factory noise volume. 
 Recognized as an expert in “making up acoustical specifications for new and old 
auditoriums and by technical experts in producing equipment for sound control and for 
measuring its effects,” Burris-Meyer proposed a project to allow him further research “on the 
physical aspects of sound production and its control,” “measurement of the effect of sound upon 
audiences,” with “repeated testing” through which “individuals and large groups will yield data 
on the part that sound may have in the total effect of sensory appeals.” The theater had a specific 
value: while any successful results were projected as having uses in theaters run by institutions 
of higher learning for education and training of sound designers and engineers, which were then 
building costly theaters. Yet, more practically, given the larger project goals of understanding the 
impact of sound effects, it was only in such a controlled, live setting as an experimental theater 
that the effects of such “sensory appeals” could be observed and measured. The effects 
themselves were specifically, then, also projected to have applications stated as ranging from 
film to radio; given Burris-Meyer‟s experience, and the evidence of other documents in the 
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archive, television sound was also projected as an “eventual” application, although not 
specifically part of the main projected applications here; as it happened, television‟s anticipated 
development would be delayed by World War II.   
Not as clearly foreseen was the applicability of sound processing, control, and 
synchronization for the battlefield, although “public address” systems were also part of the 
project‟s intended applications; Burris-Meyer would later work on implementing public address 
systems to be attached to airplane wings and broadcast battlefield messages to enemy combatants 
to surrender.
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While the “sensory appeal” of sound effects ranged across domains both known and 
unknown, academic advisors were also drawn widely: Yale, UCLA (this is probably Vern 
Knudson, American Acoustical Society president, and SIT), all of which had experts in the field 
of sound effects by this time, according to project grant documents.  A Johansen at Stanford 
withdrew a request for funding, given Burris-Meyer‟s more well-known publication record. In 
any case, institutional interest was expressed across the nation, since standardization across 
institutions would allow cost reductions, providing “new techniques under controlled conditions 
of the repertory or university theatre”  “while giving the artists a new, flexible mode of stage 
expression.”72  Westinghouse provided lab space; SIT provided additional funding and graduate 
student credits, allowing “a free flow of ideas between the young and older men in a special field 
with clear opportunity of advancement.”  
In 1932-33 and 1937-38, SIT averaged an amount in unpaid tuition and bills equal to the 
amount of average funding provided from 1938 by the Rockefeller Foundation, so these grants 
were significant in terms of tuition costs at the time.  In addition, until receiving Rockefeller 
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funding, Burris-Meyer was forced to use phonograph records as his control sources, because of a 
lack of microphones and equipment at SIT.  In his work at the Paper Mill Theater, Burris-
Meyer‟s sound design had been implemented through visual observation of standing waves in 
containers of water placed in scale models of the building, an effective means of finding dead 
spots, and resulting in widely regarded improved sound quality. Bell Labs‟ Fletcher, a major 
figure in audio science, was consulted in the granting project, without significant comment, but 
the general conclusion was that Burris-Meyer‟s expertise was not particularly advanced, but 
adequate. The contemporary goals of “scientific” measurement and application combined with 
institutional “networking,” both of which framed what was essentially the electronic 
development of bioenergetic psychoacoustics research observed as theatrical, “dramatic effects” 
was thought likely to become profitable in the event of successful commercialization. The initial 
$500.00 grant-in-aid allowed the preparation of a digest of informational materials, as the grant 
was being developed, as well as the purchase of research materials: Helmholtz “Sensations of 
Tone,” Stevens, “Hearing,”  Appia, “Die Musik und die Inscenierung,”  among other sources: 
this project, then, is a late addendum to the more general transposition of post-Romantic staging 
methods into mass media which Collier (1988) notes, but here, with Appia‟s interests in “light 
and sound” reflected throughout the project‟s initial formation, but aimed ostensibly at electronic 
sound effects.  What was planned, though, as a “significant development” in the “history of the 
theater” was eminently practical in terms of tuition and equipment support, the continuing model 
of “social research,” that is, applications for art-technological “bootstrapping” learning from 
public theater and arts projects, even while its epistemological models and modes of 
implementation, initially derived from sources indebted to late  19
th
 century bioenergetics and 
post-Romantic aesthetics, applied “sound figures” to “sound effects” – although, now, towards 
66 
 
the production and possible commodification of devices inducing such effects as “mass 
hysteria.” 
 Burris-Meyer and John Marshall agreed, in 1938, on three major points of interest for 
development: First, the “physical analysis” of sound effects in the theatre,  for the application of 
technical methods to an artistic problem of growing significance, and “to produce an established 
technique which others may use in practice dependably”; second, “to establish an index of 
audience reaction, so as to provide a measure of control for the use of these techniques”; even 
without any technical capacity for psychological measurement of audience response, “one use of 
sound effects in the Stevens Theatre produced what was really mass hysteria”; thus, some index 
of the effects of sound was necessary, since properly artistic questions now include “average 
tolerance of sound effects of different intensities and of different frequencies, or again, the 
effectiveness of sound in relation to different noise levels either in the reproducing apparatus or 
in the theatre itself”; and third; the acoustics of theatre architectures.   
But the clear interest here seems to be in the “dramatic” use emphasized in point two: 
bringing audiences, with the use of the “sensory appeal” of sound effects, to states of “mass 
hysteria.”  An October 6, 1938 letter from David Stevens to Frank Jewett, vice-president of ATT, 
clarified that the work is to “determine the effect of sound on audiences, or more literally to 
control the emotional response of audiences by mechanical means.”  Asked to recommend one of 
his staff members to help analyze the possible usefulness of the project, Jewett‟s advice, 
indicated in a letter of Oct. 11 1938, was to contact Harvey Fletcher, head of Bell Labs, and both 
are slightly concerned that there may be some “embarrassment” if Bell Labs is to advise on such 
a project, given its interests in the field.  Still, advisors like Fletcher did point out that while 
theatrical public address systems were recognized to be of poor quality given what was known to 
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be technically capable, while this project had merits, any program that would actually succeed 
would have to be much larger.  Thus, this project was a typical Rockefeller Foundation project, 
in that the goals were partially speculative, but grounded, always, in establishing institutional 
networks that might ultimately grow into much larger, actually feasible mass media development 
projects serving commercial interests but having “educational” or “dramatic” uses.  Non-
commercial, “social research,” was an important way in building not-yet commercial mass media 
systems and applications; the emergence of bioinformatic epistemologies for audience 
interaction grew out of such efforts, well understood and studied before computers with RAM 
were developed in 1950.  Typical of the research support circulated were articles like “Radio as 
an Art Form” (Educational Broadcasting, 1937) but concern was addressed by corporate backers 
about having enough technical expertise on board. 
Rockefeller‟s support provided funds for research assistants; helped in Burris Meyer‟s 
promotion to Associate Professor rank, and brought expectations (later fulfilled) that the project 
would help draw further research support to SIT.  Burris-Meyer‟s publications of project 
research helped to introduce the value of theater to engineering colleges, and conversely, 
introduced this expanded value of experimental sound in the theater in turn to the National 
Theater Conference, which re-printed an article by Burris-Meyer originally published in 
Engineering Journal.  Foundation support also allowed Burris-Meyer to pursue support from 
NBC‟s television research unit with an appeal to Gilbert Seldes; motion picture researchers also 
hoped to become involved. But in 1939, telephone conversations between John Marshall and 
Burris-Meyer revealed Marshall‟s concerns about the sound designer‟s meeting with Seldes.  
Competition between NBC and CBS over television would be secretive and fierce as production 
went into experimental phases.  Marshall was concerned about Burris-Meyer‟s naiveté, but after 
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the conversation, he concluded that in fact the theatrical sound designer had been shrewd to try 
to get TV corporations to sponsor his programming.  Burris-Meyer wanted to measure audience 
response to the sound effects, and considered wiring audience members with a “psycho-
galvanometer.”  Marshall: “This could be a tenable position on the ground that for effective 
response emotion involvement is required.  If the psycho-galvanometer gives even a rough 
measure of emotional involvement, perhaps that is sufficient for Burris-Meyer‟s purposes.”    
Marshall urged Burris-Meyer to seek consultation from psychologists who had consulted on the 
Princeton Radio Project, like Mark May or Lawrence K. Frank, although he cautioned about 
Frank‟s “characteristic eagerness to get any measure of aesthetic response that were [sic] 
possible.”  Further, Burris-Meyer worked through the American Film Center to experiment with 
the recording of sound effects on film.  Rockefeller support, particularly through Marshall‟s 
insights and wide ranging personal network, typically and vastly expanded the human and 
institutional resources of any project grantee, in addition to monetary support. 
 The “sound control apparatus” built with Foundation funding provided for six sound 
sources, mastered to three channels: enabling live stereo mixing, in other words.  Output 
included eight amplifiers and speakers, allowing environmental sound: any sound source could 
be reproduced as a fixed, moving, or, conversely unheard, “at any apparent distance, moving in 
any apparent direction, and any physiologically safe intensity with any quality and any apparent 
reverberation.”   Channel shift was accomplished by “pushy buttons rather than patch cords”; the 
control device was claimed to double standard capacity but massively reduce complexity.
73
  In 
an interview on October 18, the Foundation‟s David Stevens learned from Burris-Meyer that he 
had demonstrated the system at Carnegie Hall for three weeks  
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“with singers who are enthusiastic about his techniques.  This week he has secured an arrangement with the 
Metropolitan [Opera] to make installations for use throughout the winter.  Evidently, he has now the 
certainty of recognition that makes our grant seem to be entirely justified. He also is working with the 
people at the Lewisohn Stadium.  Mrs. Simon Guggenheim is ready to make a contribution toward the 
installation of a new experimental public address system.” 
 
On installing his equipment in the Metropolitan Opera, Burris-Meyer claimed to find 
results that “may be almost revolutionary” for theories of reverberation.  His backstage 
loudspeaker system circulated back those portions of the amplified sound important for 
maintaining pitch and cuing, with a delay of less than 1/10 of a second, which Paul Robeson was 
reported to have loved so much he called it “Cynthia.”  Stevens noted Burris-Meyer‟s claims: 
“The effect, Burris-Meyer points out, is comparable to that of bathroom singing.  The singer instead of 
unusually straining to project his voice because of this playback gains confidence to rely on its natural 
projection.  Robeson, after having used his „cynthia‟ throughout a strenuous concert tour, reports that he 
feels far less fatigued from singing and that he cannot now dispense with the apparatus.”   
 
In 1940, Burris-Meyer began to expand his activities to “music in industry,” that is, 
beginning a period of working for the Muzak Corporation, while continuing work on a 1941 
“sound show”: a public demonstration “designed to test the theatrical effectiveness of the re-
made human voice, subsonics, and reverberation control, by techniques developed in the course 
of sound research at Stevens.”  Guests from New York‟s arts, technology, and administrative 
elite included Iris Berry, of the Museum of Modern Art, (who helped to shape Eisler‟s proposal 
by promising archival space at MoMA for his film music experiments).  A memo dated April 18, 
1941 noted:  “JM [John Marshall] has the clear impression that BM [Burris-Meyer] has 
developed a most promising instrument but that he does not know how best to play upon it.”  
But: “Evidently BM and his collaborators are so pre-occupied with the creation of sound that 
they seem to have little critical judgment in estimating its effect. For example, they did create 
most erie [sic] voices for the witches in “Macbeth,” but so erie that at least two-thirds of the lines 
were unintelligible.”   
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Marshall suggested that the technology be given to a more professional educational 
theatre, suggesting Yale‟s theatrical group. Another Rockefeller commentator, in the same 
document, attached his views, noting promising effects using reverberation control in an organ 
performance: “The lower tones seemed to EA [an unidentified observer at the demonstration] to 
surpass in quality whatever sound system may have been used in the film “Fantasia.”  The treble 
was too metallic, though, whether by performer or sound system.  “The most imaginative thing 
in the show, so it seemed to EA, was that created by dubbing the re-made voice to the character 
of Ariel in “The Tempest.”  Through amplifiers placed in various parts of the theatre, the voice 
of Ariel spoke to the characters on the stage.  If worked out more smoothly, the idea would 
certainly seem to have possibilities for use in a number of well-known plays that come to mind.”  
And, “The most professional moments in the evening came in scenes from the “Emperor Jones” 
with Paul Robeson. The use of the subsonic drum was very smoothly done in that it didn‟t call 
attention to itself but was a part of the whole effect – as it should have been.”   
Here, Robeson‟s contributions provide instances of mastery, not surprising given 
Robeson‟s long insights and practice with Burris-Meyer‟s equipment, and indicate the ways that 
sound technology and raced performance of music provided an advanced exemplar of sound 
technology mastery as vocal performance.  But more broadly, Disney‟s Fantasia provided the 
general model not only for acoustic quality in exhibition, but a more general image of sound and 
image manipulation.  In practice, then, raced musical mastery, and animated sound-image effects 
which could be industrialized in electronic control devices and travel across media 
complemented audience effects like “mass hysteria” as the conditions of verification for the 
projects‟ goals.   
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An April 20, 1941 article in the Bridgeport (Connecticut) Post compared Burris-Meyer‟s 
work, again, to Disney‟s Fantasia, pointing out the general similarity of control techniques 
developed for sound and image, and the broad applicability of these techniques across radio, 
film, and theater.  Fantasia‟s broadening of Fischinger‟s visual music animation in both a more 
pedagogical and commercial style is not surprising here; the film not only demonstrated sound-
image plasticity and higher fidelity control of sound-image plasticity as communicative, 
pedagogical effect as cinema, but emphasized electronic music‟s production methods transmedia 
status as itself a type of special effect. Critics like Parker Tyler had suggested that that film‟s 
mickey-mousing stylization of visual music animation did not so much elevate but rather made 
fun of mass audience‟s musical knowledge.  But here, musicality is understood not within an 
attempt to elucidate for a mass audience classical music‟s characterological effects by doubling 
the compositional quality, unheard by the mass audience, in the visible domain.  Rather, 
musicality enabled a “technicolor” proof of affective public address, raising the possibility of 
greater audience involvement and the spectre of greater audience manipulation; the clear 
educational and commercial application for musicality as “control” stressed in Burris-Meyer‟s 
“sound show” with Robeson‟s performance and in works like Disney‟s Fantasia were as much 
justifications for, as much as demonstrations of, the use of advanced technologies for time-based 
media composition and reception in a virtual public sphere.  These forms of verification were 
radically distinct, then, from those developed as statistical methods, consumer biography, and 
automatic recording devices in the Princeton Radio Project. 
 In 1941, Burris-Meyer went on to demonstrate the control of stereophonic effects, as his 
report on the “Sound Show” was distributed to the American Acoustical Society and the Society 
of Motion Picture Engineers. Burris-Meyer‟s star in academia continued to rise, being elected a 
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fellow of the Acoustical Society, and chairman of the fall meeting to be held in New York City.  
But a May 6, 1941, article in the New York Telegraph noted the problem of synthetic, electronic 
sound and aesthetics as a mismatch, in “The Stage Today: Artificially Made Stage Sounds 
Demonstrated at Stevens Institute.”  The use of electronic control was found “unaesthetic,” and 
the article raised general doubts as to the general effectiveness of these attempts to use synthetic, 
electronic sound in the theatre or concert hall, noting the broad applications claimed in Burris-
Meyer‟s article, “The Control of Acoustic Conditions on the Concert Stage” published in the 
Journal of the Acoustic Society of America.  In summer, further, the Rockefeller Foundation 
indicated that they would not fund Burris-Meyer‟s proposed expansion of the study into “Music 
in Industry.”   The concerns here were not the aesthetics of electronic sound for dramatic 
purposes, which Rockefeller staff seemed to think, could be improved given the right context, 
talent, and applications.  Rather, concerns had to do with the cost of further developing the 
project for a non-commercial institutional network without reliable standardization. Stevens 
Institute of Technology‟s theater was not considered optimally suited for the increasing 
complexity and quality the equipment did provide; but it was too expensive for other academic 
institutions to adopt, apart, perhaps, from Yale.  While the Metropolitan Opera might accept it as 
a gift, Burris-Meyer would have to consult in order to maintain and optimize its use, implying 
additional questions of long-term funding for consulting, maintenance, and deployment, without 
broader commercialization, and for artistic institutions without budgets for these needs.  Further, 
there were concerns at the Rockefeller Foundation of Burris-Meyer‟s conflicts of interest in 
combining “trade” and non-profit “research.”  Burris-Meyer would concentrate on publishing 
results and bringing the project to an end.   
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But the wartime economy provided the path toward even greater funding and even 
greater potential efficacy. In September, Burris-Meyer was approached by the Navy Sub-
committee on Sound Sources of the National Defense Research Council about taking over his 
project for one year with a budget of $50,000.  SIT “regarded this as virtually a command 
performance.  The Institute therefore will raise no objection.”  Thus, even while the Rockefeller 
Foundation began to bow out, having done its part in creating an institutional network allowing 
the project‟s applications across cultural, factory, and military industries, uncertainty for 
commercial deployment in arts institutions and as yet gradual interest from factory 
administrations was mitigated by the even greater funding possibilities provided by the military.  
These were considered part of the long-term development trajectory of the sound control project; 
in January 1942, in a letter to Marshall, Burris-Meyer stated his beliefs that military uses would, 
in turn, be of use for the theater when the war ended. A February 4, 1942 article in the Hoboken 
Observer reported that Burris-Meyer, along with Lieutenant Vincent Mallory, a sound engineer 
who had been working with him, had been assigned to the Bureau of Ships in Washington.  Their 
accomplishments in sound design for theater, and the implications for war, are summarized: a 
sound control system at Stevens; the only electronic control of sound ever used in the 
Metropolitan Opera; the “acoustic envelope,” a widely acclaimed aid to concert singers and 
musicians; the “thunder screen”; and a great variety of special sound control and test apparatus.   
A May 10, 1942 article in the Asbury Park [New Jersey] Press dramatically suggested 
the possible effects of this environmental, controllable sound installation equipment for motion 
pictures “at war,” with a collage of a bomber bursting through the cinema screen, the headline 
emphasizing the affective, mass corporeal power being projected here for a near-future cinema: 
“New Theatre Sound Effects May Knock You in the Aisle.”  A Los Angeles company which 
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planned to supply “wired music” (that is, Muzak-style ambient sound installation) to a defense 
contractor in California inquires about the use of Burris-Meyer‟s equipment. And Burris-Meyer‟s 
Sound in the Theatre is completed for distribution.  The power of sound control to create 
musical, corporeal synchronization across a variety of environments across the war-time 
economy where workers movements and visual surroundings were radically different was duly 
noted by the Foundation in a summary document dated March 29, 1943.  Theatre companies 
nationwide had sent staff to war to work on camouflage and lighting;  Pasadena Playhouse staff 
now worked part-time in industry; the Cleveland Play House was presenting plays in industries 
of that region, turning a profit instead of losing money as expected; Smith College was creating 
plays for production in some thirty factories;  while Yale had lost staff expert at camouflage and 
lighting, Burris-Meyer at Stevens, along with his equipment, had been requisitioned by the 
Navy.”74  A “Guide to Industrial Sound” is published by the War Production Board, authored by 
Burris-Meyer and R. L. Cardinell.   
“Sound control” thus worked for the Rockefeller Foundation, as “regressive listening” 
had for Theodor Adorno, as a general signifier of cultural, factory, and military industries, 
although here, not marching lock step, but rather, in a variegated set of transitions and 
transpositions which had to be cultivated, and their long-term implications noted in order to 
evaluate requests for funding, in terms of both conflicts between “trade” and “research,” as well 
as the aesthetic and technical advances that were occurring, in order to come to conclusions 
about the future value for furthering the actual, non-profit status upon which the Foundations‟ 
goal of developing non-profit, educational, industrial, and military institutional networks was 
based.  This difference is in fact the crux of Adorno and Horkheimer‟s argument: it actually 
doesn‟t matter in the overall commoditization of listening across educational, artistic, working, 
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consuming, and military environments, and the “culture industries” were the commercial arm 
legitimating a broader control of consciousness.  But for the Rockefeller Foundation, these 
distinctions were important; on the one hand, aesthetic advances in mass media could not happen 
without the networks it administratively cultivated; without aesthetic advances in mass media, 
industry would not know what to develop, nor the aims of development; and any military uses 
would have to be industrially feasible in order to gain defense funding and development.  Thus, 
what was for Adorno and Horkheimer a general condition of capital was for the Rockefeller 
Foundation quite the opposite: a series of overlapping and affiliated efforts whose key points of 
transition had to be carefully identified for evaluation, which would determine which projects to 
select for funding, and when to end funding.  Given the value of speculative development as a 
key part of their operations, both non-profit arts and educational applications and commercial 
applications were secondary to funded projects‟ potential to generate institutional alliances and 
affiliations, such that administrative human capital would remain with the Foundation, to be re-
applied in other projects coordinated within the same historical moment, and future projects to 
come. 
After the war, as Chair of the Music Committee of the Acoustical Society of America, 
Burris-Meyer redefined policy around musical acoustics. “A Study by the Music Committee,” 
with actions by the Executive Council on February 15, 1947, added additional members to the 
Music Committee, and implemented changes to be later reported to the Executive Council at the 
next Society meeting.  The policy document directed that the Acoustical Society undertake “a. 
the development of a common terminology for all people concerned with music; b. the fixing of 
criteria for the measurement of music and its effect upon people; c. the establishment of a facility 
for the exchange of information between individuals and groups engaged in research or 
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developmental activities in various aspects of music, where no effective liaison exists at 
present.”  Given music‟s current “infinite” capacity with advancements in electronic 
manipulation, along with its potential for both therapeutic and industrial uses, acoustics was re-
formulated as a “common meeting ground, by virtue of the breadth of the field […].”  Facts were 
given to support this new direction of acoustics more as speculative problematization than as 
concretely defined discipline. First: “Music, defined physically, is an acoustic phenomenon, and 
acoustics embraces: the design of man-made sound generators, the understanding of the structure 
and operation of the mechanism of the human voice; all means of transmission of music to the 
hearer; the physiological mechanisms and facilities by which the auditory stimulus reaches  the 
nervous system; so that both psycho-acoustics and technical engineering motivated a new 
statement of purpose: “The purpose of the Acoustical Society shall be to increase and diffuse the 
knowledge of acoustics and promote its practical applications.”  Second: “Music as an art is a 
medium by which emotion may be communicated.”  Thus, by taking up the problem of 
“survey[ing] the basic relation between the art of music and the science of acoustics,” and 
“propos[ing] a conceptual framework within which the policy of the Acoustical Society Music 
Committee may be developed, music as an art now is understood to have effects as “medium,” 
and “becomes an organ of acoustics, so to speak.”  Discussion points include technical 
possibilities emphasizing the potential ubiquity for synchronization given music as a medium 
and as an “organ” of psycho-technical acoustics, because it would allow for generating “any type 
of audible spectrum” for “listeners anywhere at any time”; devices (such as the ones he had 
developed) now make it possible to evaluate the psycho-physical effects of sound on audiences, 
allowing new applications such as music therapy and industrial music, increasing utilities for 
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musical entertainment “functionally, in the sense of creating a predetermined emotional 
atmosphere”.   
Thus redefining music as both technicized sound medium and as aesthetic, corporeal 
effect in reception, problems, of course, could be stated more clearly as problematics: musical 
terminology was indefinite and works against progress in the field; criteria for evaluating 
musical effects on people are too diverse to allow the correlation of a musical principle with its 
effect on the hearer; artists and those who create music don‟t understand how extensive the field 
of music actually is;  no joint efforts to address these issues exist; facilities to support such 
efforts need to be developed; and therefore acoustics is the meeting ground by which these 
activities can be developed. Burris-Meyer‟s proposal was noted in a conference bulletin of “The 
New York Meeting of the Acoustical Society of America, May 8, 9, and 10, 1947.” 
Burris-Meyer‟s “music” is treated as a site for simultaneously aestheticizing and 
technicizing research and development of music as mass corporeal affect, and expands acoustics 
to the status of a transdiscipline or super-discipline which might further develop audience 
response as musical effect.  The demands of such a super-discipline are the converse of the 
concrete development, in the same period, of cybernetics as a science of human, animal, and 
machine control, as Wiener‟s (1948) formulation understood it.  But more specifically, in Burris-
Meyer, acoustics departs from either the more traditional concerns of analysis of either musical 
sound, of naturally-occurring sound, human speech, or animal communication, or of 
physiological or neurological problems of hearing and cognition. It sought, in essence, a 
scientistic version of that different series of transpositions by which serial music and electronic 
assemblage had redefined art music composition in the work of modernist composers like the 
earlier Schoenberg school or the slightly later work on concrete music by Schaeffer in France: a 
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version, that is, designed at technical implementation and installation across environments for 
work, medicine, recreation, or war.    
But what Burris-Meyer means by music, then, had less to do with acoustics and more to 
do with music framed as a matter of synchronizing composition, exhibition and reception, 
without any necessary distinction between live or pre-recorded composition, and for some mass 
polity situated within a broadly imagined “theater” installation.  Thus, the “theater,” too, as a 
result of this definition of “musical acoustics” as theatrical super-discipline, could be generalized 
across specific sites of reception, from dramatic theater, to opera, to the factory, or to military 
theaters of war.  In practice, while viewed with suspicion by acousticians, artists, or critics, these 
goals were understood as speculative in their conception but leading to concrete results given the 
proper, intersectional treatment through which they could be developed and clarified.  In 
supporting the powerful implications of what was more a stylistics of research than a concretely 
rounded acoustic methodology, institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation played the role of 
what is called today an “incubator” organization, funding research that was as much conceptual 
and speculative as it was concretely programmatic and open-ended. Coordinating across such 
projects for maximum benefit in light of their essentially speculative nature was what the 
Foundation was actually supporting in many such instances.   
In the process, though, music as a problem of synchronizing production, distribution, and 
reception allowed “the arts” to become generalized as a single “medium,” and allowed sciences 
like acoustics to function as “meeting grounds” in Burris-Meyer‟s view. The “man of arts 
research” would direct research projects that were as much a matter of institutional 
intersectionality, educational and aesthetic aims, and emerging technical and economic 
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developments -- much as Heidegger had noted, in 1937, the functions of “the man of research” in 
his depiction of the objectification of things and modern human subjection to a “world picture.”75   
But here, it is not a world picture at stake, and any world subjectivity is rather deeply in 
question.  What is at stake are musical streams of human conduct and technical operations which 
are increasingly understood, not as “picture” but as “media” conducted together, while allowing 
distinct positions to emerge: the powerful conducting of technicized affect for human artists 
whose insights, talents, and stature lead them to master these new effects, as Robeson did; an 
audience who could be brought to massive expressive effects such as “hysteria”; or, the “man of 
arts research” directing these innovations. All of these emergent positions depended on 
reconfiguring sites of reception in a diagrammatic, temporal streaming of conduct and 
technicized affect.  In the mid-20
th
 century U.S. context, then, “acoustics as meeting ground” was 
in part formed institutionally on the basis of post-Romantic staging theories like that of Appia, 
much like Appia‟s work had helped to inform Eisenstein‟s early theatrical work developing 
Meyerhold‟s biomechanics for the montage cinema. But in this context, the mass audience‟s 
roles and functions rather seem to have gained that “universal” reception which Metz bemoaned 
in his caricature of Eisenstein as proto-cybernetic “idealist,” but which Metz celebrated in the 
universal reception of the singular expressivity of Rossellini‟s neo-Realist cinema, a human 
“world picture” marrying arts, language, and cinema in Metz‟s “open-systems language” 
resisting the delivery of the audience to an excessive,  commoditized stream of technicized 
idealization (in the essays collected and translated into English, 1974).  If cinema continued, for 
critics like Metz, to be considered as a “world picture” framed in terms of a linguistic semiotics 
of syntax and semantics rather than in terms of complex streams of temporal relation where the 
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shifts in framing technologies themselves are implicated in the sense of the sound and image that 
is exhibited, in the Rockefeller Foundation‟s projects, the very utility of the effects of 
synchronized streaming media were understood as being incapable of being stabilized within 
cinema‟s virtual framing devices. Cinema or radio could not simply misinform audiences, but 
even more, the effects of streaming media were not containable within cinema or radio, and were 
thought to already have been distributed and become productive across theaters of factory labor, 
consumption, art, and war.  The understanding of mass media characterizing the Foundation‟s 
approaches was, essentially, temporal, if only because it had to coordinate its own administrative 
production processes in time – in the circulation of memos, telephone or written correspondence, 
funding procedures, exhibition of results achieved, testing and evaluation processes, publishing 
of the results, and the archiving of all of these processes with reference to the dates and deadlines 
relevant to them. 
Still, if there was a “world picture” at work here, the subject of its revelation in the 
Heideggerian sense, the “man of science” who coordinates, attends meetings and consultations, 
who in effect manages the world picture, would have to be John Marshall, whose careful 
selection, coordination, and support of theoretical and practical projects across the arts, sciences, 
and media industries at the Foundation were processed through those characteristic templates 
aggregating and archiving the data of Foundation participants‟ comments and memos.  In those 
memos, each project‟s progress was tracked, and Marshall‟s own contributions inscribed with the 
signatorial convention of typed initials: “JM.”  In Eisenstein‟s world, it was the state party as 
metastable organization from whose “world picture” Eisenstein‟s cinema diverged.  In Eisler‟s 
case, a distinct type of modal cinema would claim as its rationale a (mistaken) interpretation of 
Eisenstein‟s entangling of immanence and information as a parametrical claim of technical 
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progress.  Eisler and Adorno‟s misinterpretation of Eisenstein‟s graphical score as an impossible 
parametrical pairing of sound and image is, then, in spite of its errors, illustrative: if their critique 
of Eisenstein has little to do with Eisenstein‟s cinema, nonetheless it reveals the ways in which 
Adorno and Eisler mounted their own critique of the U.S. culture industries. Concretely, Eisler‟s 
modal cinema, in which the site of reception itself becomes a divisive “meeting ground” wherein 
“advanced” musical composition, working film music as score, sound effect, and affective, 
gestural response against the streaming cinematic image, was more concretely a mediation of 
two models of cultural production brought to bear on one another: one, the research approach he 
originated within the context of the Rockefeller Foundation‟s support of the Princeton Radio 
Project, Burris-Meyer‟s theatrical sound control project, and his own film music project; and the 
other, Hollywood‟s industrial organizational style which subordinated musical composition to 
rational procedures based on intensifying divisions of creative labor, and which separated the 
composer from arrangement, recording, and sound mixing functions, thus allowing technical 
advancement to go hand in hand with what Eisler felt was the factory reproduction of outdated 
musical clichés and the atomization of cinema audiences into false individuality and 
conformism.  Still, it is important to note that this approach, bringing cultural administration to 
bear on cultural industrialization, has little place for the overtly political work in Weimar, under 
National Socialism, or in the rapidly shrinking sites of left European cinema production in the 
1930s. 
 After the war and his de-commission from the U.S. military, Burris-Meyer ended his 
work on industrial uses of music and, clearing his conflicts of interest, returned to the 
Rockefeller Foundation with a funding request, sending a letter to David Stevens on July 15, 
1946, stating his aim of “achieving control of emotion through the medium of the arts.”   Burris-
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Meyer believed that his theatrical sound control equipment might be built into the architecture of 
an opera house he had heard that Nelson Rockefeller planned to build at Rockefeller Center. 
Marshall responded on July 17, 1946 with a statement that he knew nothing of such plans, but 
offered to have visitors from the Theatre Section of the Dutch Ministry of Education meet with 
Burris-Meyer on an upcoming visit in fall of that year for National Theatre Conference. 
Preparing a draft proposal of a research program given to David Stevens January 24, 1947, 
Burris-Meyer continued to advance proposals outlining facilities to “increase the effectiveness of 
the arts,” that is, for enhancing audience control through musical affect, in “theatre arts standard 
and non-standard,” medicine, industry, and so forth.  He believed necessary for these goals:  
a) “precise definition and measurement of arts forms 
b) mass reaction of subjects unencumbered by apparatus 
c) development of a scale of affective intensity.”  
 Stevens‟ response was that Burris-Meyer seems to have learned much during his time in 
the military, but that the goals of the proposed project were remote from what the Foundation 
was supporting in drama at the time.  On February 3, 1947, Burris-Meyer alerted Stevens in a 
letter that his group‟s work at Muzak has been completed, while other projects have been 
deferred. He had quit his work as Vice-President of the Muzak Corporation, and would 
concentrate on his educational activities at SIT.  This concession was intended to reassure people 
at the Foundation who worried about conflicts of interest in “trade” and “art,” so, henceforth 
Burris-Meyer would only serve as a consultant to Muzak.  Marshall responded, in an interview 
on March 28, 1947, with the suggestion that if publication of prior results looked likely, Burris-
Meyer might receive a grant-in-aid from the RF.  Subsequently, Harvey Davis of SIT submitted 
Burris-Meyer‟s draft reports on two military projects, showing that Foundation support led to 
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successful major military funding, and that in turn the Foundation‟s support could now help 
return Burris-Meyer‟s efforts to “channels useful in peace”: 
“I like to think that the various research ramifications that have grown out of your former grant have more 
than justified it, although the direction which the research finally took was quite different from the foreseen 
one.  I am told that some of the later work that grew out of the original Rockefeller investigation led to an 
expenditure by the armed services of between fifty and one hundred million dollars in production contracts 
for material actually used in the war and that, in at least one case, the tide of an important battle was turned 
in the Allies‟ favor, at least in part, by equipment of this sort.”76  
 
Burris-Meyer more grandiosely claimed broader effects for his efforts with a survey of 
the contemporary field.  He notes in his own report that approximately five million people in 
America now “work” to music.  By time of this report, he had received a lightened teaching load 
and secretarial assistance for correlating all of the various project reports (SIT, War Department, 
and Muzak); a director of the Stevens Theatre was appointed to further relieve him of directing 
duties; and SIT provided funds to repair the now run-down equipment.  He asks the Foundation 
for additional funds to complete the task of returning to his research, restoring and renovating the 
equipment, and publishing the results.  To clarify the concrete fruits of his research as applied 
during the war, he includes a print version of a talk delivered on radio April 30, 1947 on General 
Electric‟s Science Forum program (broadcast weekly from Schenectady, NY over WGY), 
entitled “Shouting from the Sky.”   
The talk concerned several iterations of the “talking airplane” project, in which form his 
“sound in the theater” research had been deployed by the War Department. He notes that the idea 
originated as a way of projecting advertising messages from the sky, like banner planes.  For the 
military, the problem was that the flying public address system had to be close enough to be 
heard, but distant enough not to be shot down.  Thus, the project tackled not only broadcasting at 
high volume, but also comprehension of speech at high volume through turbulent air, from a 
plane travelling at high speed, and potentially facing enemy fire.  The project was called “Project 
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Polly,” presumably a reference to the high-fidelity “parroting” desired for the messages to be 
broadcast.  Fidelity, again, was not simply a matter of technical measures or the effective clarity 
of the message heard but a matter of synchronizing audience response with the intentions of the 
broadcaster of the message: in the best of circumstances, surrender.  “Polly” was authorized by 
the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics and built by Bell Telephone Laboratories and Western Electric 
Company.  Two such devices were built and passed testing on Armistice Day in 1943 at Cherry 
Point Marine Airfield in North Carolina. 
The first model consisted of a 500-watt amplifying system, mounted in a Navy Ventura 
bomber, understandable over an area of “several hundred acres.”  It was used in 1944 in 
campaigns for Wotje Atoll, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.  The attempt was to “give the first 
real news” concerning the state of the war and to encourage the Japanese to surrender.  “The first 
programs resulted in only a few surrenders, but this number increased rapidly as the programs 
were repeated.”  Polly experienced increasing fire as the Japanese realized her effectiveness, he 
says.  Damaged by flak fire, more distance was needed from the field, resulting next in a 2000-
watt system being deployed, with two speakers each containing 36 speaker units mounted in the 
plane, creating a sound intensity level of 130 decibels 30 feet in front of the loudspeakers. Polly 
used either live address or recorded material.  The recordings were made on magnetized wire; 
speakers were mounted behind movable panels in the side of Navy PB- 4Y- 2 (the Navy‟s 
version of the B-24).  For long messages, the airplane circled.  Messages were audible from 
10,000 feet in the air. Polly was used to tell enemy troops remaining in occupied islands that the 
war was over and gave directions for surrender, reducing remaining fighting, he says.  Peacetime 
emergency uses are obvious, although so were the problems.  Commercial uses would be likely 
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to ignite anti-noise legislation.  “A lot of people don‟t even like to have an airplane flying 
overhead, let alone an airplane that insists on shouting at them.” 77 
The Foundation responded with RF Grant #47110 on October 17, 1947 providing $9,600 
for personnel and evaluative equipment design and construction, towards a modular sound 
control system and a manual for its use, as had been outlined in the “Sound in the Theatre” 
Report #7.  Not too surprisingly, the projects snowballed into numerous dimensions.  In a 
February 10, 1948 telephone conversation, the Foundation‟s Charles B Fahs heard that 
equipment specs had been completed, and engineering meeting would shortly finalize plans for 
the next stage.  But Burris-Meyer also needed data for these next stages; thus, the analysis of 
theatrical plays was proceeding as well, including over 100 scripts including previous SIT 
productions and plays currently in production in New York.  These don‟t seem to have been 
directly funded by Rockefeller funds, so these analyses were not filed in their archives.  But the 
Rockefeller portions of the funding supported progress on the equipment Manual, and two 
graduate research assistants, one of whom, John Beaumont, was on loan from Yale, where he 
was studying technical control of light with George Izenour. In a letter to David Stevens from 
SIT‟s Harvey Davis, dated September 29, 1948, the results of the funded work over the long-
term period of Rockefeller support were summarized: course teaching and research ongoing 
before the war has now been jump-started, thanks to the recent grant.  Audio engineering classes 
were now over-enrolled.  He also mentions ongoing conversations about installing the “Stevens 
Sound Control System” in a new opera house planned for Los Angeles and in the Yale Theatre, 
and the possible formation of a new commercial organization to realize these projects.  
According to Davis‟ letter, Burris-Meyer had also received an additional grant from a group 
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called the “Research Corporation” for “instrumentation for determining the effect on individuals 
and on audiences of controlled sound.”  Together with the Rockefeller Foundation monies, these 
funds would help extend the potential of music therapy. 
Again, evaluations on the event of another request for $5000 raised questions about the 
technical rigor of the work, and the lack of publication in engineering journals.  Yale‟s Izenour 
was unimpressed with Burris-Meyer; an audio consultant, Robert Darrell, was sent to SIT to 
check out Burris-Meyer‟s work.  Darrell saw that peer-reviewed publications in engineering 
journals were disturbingly absent, and would have to be arranged in order for technical 
specifications, and so, standardization and commoditization, to be feasible. But he felt that the 
system had advantages, and showed potential.  Still, on the basis of these mixed evaluations, the 
Foundation turned down the request for funding a portable, modular unit.  The project was 
concluded in December of 1948, with the final financial statements submitted in January 1949. 
This history of musicality‟s expansion across all conceivable “theaters” of technicized 
sound and listening conduct in everyday post-war life takes a strange turn as the Foundation‟s 
support ended.  On May 16, 1949, Rockefeller Foundation‟s Charles B. Fahs ran into Burris-
Meyer on the train platform at Penn Station in Newark, and rode with him to Philadelphia. 
Burris-Meyer was in uniform as a naval officer, heading to Washington for further military 
research work.  They arranged to meet again on the 19
th
, after   Burris-Meyer outlined his longer 
range plan for work on “the problem of the control of human emotion as a determinant of 
action.”  
“B-M points out that it was realization that we were moving into an era when such control of human 
emotion would be technically possible which led to the development of Nazism in Germany.  It is clearly 
indicated in “Mein Kampf” and in the work of Goebbels.  According to B-M, his wartime work 
demonstrated that means to control emotion with sufficient precision to determine the action of from two to 
eight percent of a given population are within sight.  While this percentage of a population is small, it is 
perhaps quite adequate to be decisive.  There is no use ignoring the possibility of such techniques and 
hoping that the disturbing visions of what the effects in politics might be will go away.  The question is 
rather, as in the case of the atom bomb, whether the techniques will be mastered and utilized for democratic 
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purposes before they are exploited for totalitarian purposes.  This is the background of B-M‟s conviction 
that this work is important and urgent in the United States.” 78 
 
That lunch conversation on October 19, 1949 produced puzzlement over Burris-Meyer‟s 
claims about relieving “neurotic tension” through music, a Foundation memo notes: “He seems 
to belong in the undefined borderland which may include scientists, geniuses and crackpots.  
Much good can occasionally come out of this area but it certainly strains the pathfinding abilities 
of foundation officers.  CBF and I agree tentatively to visit B-M at his laboratory for a further 
look at the blazes on the trees.”  A golden age of institutional support for audience listening, 
sound, and film music, a nexus for research into audience uplift, critical theoretical speculation, 
and late Romantic inspirations for generalized sound theaters, had reached the end of the line. 
 
Chapter 5 
Eisler’s Film Music Project: Critical Theory For Hollywood 
 
In a Grant Resolution dated January 19, 1940, Hans Eisler was awarded $20,160 for 
“experimental demonstrations of Music In Film Production over the two-year period beginning 
February 1, 1940.”  Eisler‟s pioneering biography in modern music and cinema was a large part 
of the trust the Foundation placed in him, and he was one of the few artists granted such a sizable 
grant: a student of Schoenberg, known as one of the foremost film music composers, selected as 
the composer for the first sound film issued by the German film company Tobis.  Eisler 
projected four experimental demonstrations:  
1) utilizing new types of musical material (that is, serial composition technique) in film 
production 
2) problems of instrumentation 
3) problems of blending music and sound-effect 
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4) music in film specifically related to film content, that is, research towards a 
“rudimentary” aesthetics of film and music.   
Eisler was to deposit negatives of the completed material (not specified: were these to be 
scores, soundtracks, or films composited with his completed soundtracks?) in the Film Library of 
MoMA (where the materials were never deposited), to make them available to students and 
filmmakers at a nominal charge; additionally, full reports were to be produced about the project, 
and made available without charge; and Eisler would publish a book on the subject depending on 
the results.
79
 
As in the Princeton Radio and Sound in the Theater projects, but in only a nominal 
amount ($500), funds were directed towards the “measurement of audience reaction.”  The 
project was conceived to complement the Burris-Meyer work: 
“In general, Dr. Eisler‟s belief is that the use of music in film production has become conventional to a 
degree that neglects many of the more promising possibilities for utilizing it to best effect.  A considerable 
number of musicians engaged in film making are alive to such possibilities and capable of realizing them in 
their work.  The need, then, is not for greater skill in composition but rather for an exposition of methods 
which the composer can use to his/her advantage.  The Foundation by its grant to Stevens Institute of 
Technology for research in the control of sound for dramatic purposes is contributing to work on the 
problem of making sound a more effective medium of dramatic production.  The present recommendation 
recognizes the importance of a similar study of music in film.”80  
 
That the Foundation describes Eisler‟s Film Music Project as “similar” to that of Burris-
Meyer‟s should not be interpreted as a vague justification.  Rather, radio, sound effects, and 
serial music composition could all be conceived as shedding light on problems of media 
composition and reception, where music was understood to inform the necessary, if forced, 
problematic of “reactive,” corporeal effects and a mass media aesthetics, motivated both by the 
diffusion of sound reproduction technologies through factories, schools, cultural institutions, 
cinema, and military operations, but shaped within the mission of institutional uplift which 
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typified Rockefeller projects. For instance, part of the rationale provided by Alvin Johnson, 
Director of the New School for Social Research which would support and situate Eisler‟s efforts, 
was the Foundation‟s support for “scores of refugee scholars” like Adorno through their period 
of adjustment; another was the acknowledgement that mass media cultural industries were in fact 
just that: purveyors of mass culture, whose quality, however, was suspect.  Johnson thus 
described Eisler‟s combative reputation as an asset:  
“The Rockefeller Foundation has done a wonderful work in making it possible for scores of refugee 
scholars to live through the period of adjustment.  When the history of American culture is written fifty 
years from now the historian will point to many new impulses given to the sciences by this work of the 
Foundation.  The arts, particularly in their creative aspects, are more difficult to deal with.  It would be hard 
to hold a man like Eisler within the framework of an ordinary educational institution.  Necessarily he will 
develop relations with industry.  But it is with an industry which plays or ought to play a tremendously 
important part in our culture; and any contribution that tends to raise its level of merit deserves support.”81 
 
Eisler‟s program is ambitious: he includes, for example, possible uses for synthetic 
sound, which he never actually was able to implement, and which he doesn‟t address in his book 
with Adorno of 1947.  Marshall was impressed with the proposal, and had Jones vet Eisler about 
any possible connection with the “communists or more particularly the Stalin-Trotzky [sic] row.”  
Apparently, Eisler‟s friendship with Joseph Losey, whose film A Child Goes Forth Eisler scored 
in the course of his Rockefeller project, was mentioned as politically suspect, and according to 
Johnson, “has set out to storm your heaven to prove that he belongs to no communist tribe at all. 
I‟m glad to have him prove it.”  (Johnson letter to Marshall, 11/16/39).  Eisler clarified the 
project goals, emphasizing that re-scoring extant films would allow a demonstration of better 
methods of composition, not necessarily superior composition; serial composition would inform 
a methodology of film music scoring that might be taken up broadly.  
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Iris Barry at MoMA provided a list of Eisler‟s film works to Marshall, surprised at the 
small number, apparently, and expecting to find more.
82
 Lazarsfeld expressed support also, 
saying that Eisler came from a “liberal” family, his work was “some of the best mass art of the 
post-war republican period,” Eisler was “far above the average” both as pianist and as 
theoretician, and felt that while “he hasn‟t quite the deep intellectual sincerity and great freshness 
of approach which Dr. Adorno has, but that his interests lie in the same direction and that from a 
practical point of view he might be easier to handle.”83  Consultations and coordination 
continued in interviews dated January 3, 1940: Eisler met with Harry Robin, who worked as 
assistant to Burris-Meyer; Robin seems to have had a Rockefeller Fellowship from before the 
time Burris-Meyer‟s project was awarded, and the Foundation seemed to be placing him in these 
various projects, probably both to help foment collaboration and to provide additional 
observations about the actual progress in each case. Costs were pared;  audience evaluation and 
measurement techniques were discussed,  but Marshall didn‟t believe that any psychological test 
existed that could measure the results in this case, and suggested not a lay audience but 
collection of statements characterizing and describing the effects in question by articulate 
receivers aware of their emotional reactions.  He also mentions Lazarsfeld‟s device developed at 
Princeton, which consists of a small box with two buttons, one pressed for favorable response, 
one pressed for a negative response.  These responses are thus noted on a moving tape which can 
be synchronized with movements of a musical score.  Eisler was eager, and Lazarsfeld had 
already indicated willingness to cooperate, so the $500 budget item for evaluation was projected 
for tests using both qualitative feedback and Lazarsfeld‟s device.   
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Other responses to the proposal were positive; MoMA would act as archival custodian of 
the results; Ivens, then President of the Association of Documentary Film Producers, wanted to 
see this kind of work deployed in the experimental program his Association hoped to begin. 
Eisler‟s proposal was able to propose both short-term and long-term outcomes warranted by 
figures of considerable stature. Eisler had also been in touch with Burris-Meyer, with whom 
Robin had been working for some time.  Where non-musical sound effects are involved, Eisler is 
reported to have expressed interest in collaborating; thus, Eisler‟s film music project was 
understood as dovetailing with Rockefeller projects already underway with significant funding.  
His proposal was granted for a two-year period; Eisler began with Johnson‟s hosting the project 
at the New School.   
With these projects in place, a synthetic, sound-on-film project proposed by a 
Moskowitz, given Eisler‟s negative appraisal of the proposal as derivative of others‟ work, that 
proposal was turned down in February 1940.  Synthetic sound on film projects, as Moritz (2004) 
notes, had been attempted by animator Oskar Fischinger and director Ruben Mamoulian; articles 
proposing such effects or translation devices to achieve them appeared in Hollywood Quarterly 
(Becker, 1945; Potter, 1947).  The notion was current in the Soviet context as well, resulting in 
the slightly later development of the “ANS” device for the graphical scoring of synthetic sound, 
as Galeyev (1988) reports, although it is not clear as to the prior work which Eisler had in mind.  
Historically, “visual music” theorists have attributed such attempts at writing sound in magnetic, 
electrical, electronic, or digital media as indebted to a larger history of “color organs,” alchemy, 
or Pythagorean or neo-Pythagorean epistemologies.  Here, though, we see the tensions in clear 
detail: at stake is a historical transition between essentially bioenergetic epistemologies after 
Helmholtz and bioinformatic epistemologies emerging with Turing, Wiener, or Shannon.  In the 
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course of this large-scale historical transition in which bioinformatic epistemologies drew from 
and displaced bioenergetic ones, the production of machine tools for synchronizing sound and 
image for scientific, recreational, or educational purposes manifested these tensions in visions of 
speculative machines for writing sound as music.  But Eisler‟s project was a musically literate, 
critically informed attempt, grounded in materialist epistemologies and ontologies (rather than 
speculative ones), at diagramming a musical ethics of industrial sound-image synchronization.  
Clearly, the Rockefeller Foundation‟s careful project management and coordination, concerns 
with social effects of contemporary radio broadcasting (as in the Princeton Radio Project), and 
interests in supporting the practical development of electronic technologies for sound synthesis 
and modulation (as in Burris-Meyer‟s work) contributed in great part to Eisler‟s ability to 
introduce a materialist critique into the problematic of transitioning sound-image synchronization 
methods where contemporaries relied on proposals of new art forms, speculative philosophy, or 
the possible production potential of powerful, but ultimately largely speculative or impractical, 
machine tools.  The dancing soundtrack of Disney‟s Fantasia was the narrativized form of the 
imagined potential of the technical, affective, and cultural power imagined for visualized musical 
sound in the midst of the transition from bioenergetic to bioinformatic models of matter, 
knowledge, and action; Eisler‟s variable scores designed to test the resources of new music after 
Schoenberg
84
 for their applicability in cinema were the critical, administrative corollary. 
The New York Herald Tribune announced the project to the public on February 23, 1940: 
“Rockefeller Fund Grants $20,000 for Film Study.”  According to this article, Eisler would have 
the support of RCA and members of the Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra for his investigation 
of the “relationship between music and dialogue, use of sounds and noises, and the problem of 
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orchestration and dramaturgy, and materials of instrumentation.” “The musical scores will be 
recorded with the help of the best musicians and conductors and performed before a group of 
artistic and scientific specialists,” the article noted. It also mentioned Eisler‟s theater work on 
Gorki‟s Mother and Odets‟ Night Music which had opened the previous night. 
 But problems in securing films for re-scoring surfaced. Disney provided a Donald Duck 
film, but not with separated image, score, vocal, and foley tracks.  Eisler was put in touch with 
both the American Film Center and MoMA to secure film material, in addition to the 
documentary material on glaciers that he was scoring for Frontier Films at the same time.  The 
problem was that documentary material was easily obtained, but getting hold of dramatic, feature 
film or animated material, intended as part of the project, proved difficult.  Background checks 
on Eisler continued well into the summer of 1940, coordinated for Marshall by Johnson at the 
New School.  As the project proceeded, Eisler‟s background in political, agitative uses of music 
always provided his increasing networks of connections with Hollywood distributors, producers, 
and artistic figures. 
 Eisler was put in touch that summer with both the Hays Office and studio officials in 
Hollywood, also involved in Foundation projects, in hopes of facilitating access to films. 
Meanwhile, the project‟s innovative goals continued to make headlines in then Palestine. But a 
budget statement provided to the Foundation by Eisler and the New School in March of 1941, a 
note written on the budget indicates continued difficulties obtaining films to use, despite 
considerable efforts by the Foundation.  Meanwhile, Eisler had fired his assistant, Harry Robin, 
who had earlier worked for Burris-Meyer. “The difficulty in obtaining film material from the 
industry even with the help of the Hays office has delayed some recordings.  These recordings 
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will now be made in the second year instead.  The total budget as originally submitted is 
unchanged.”  Another year of funding was requested, but denied. 
 A request was granted, however, to extend the duration of the project without additional 
funds, in early 1942, with the project scheduled for completion by November 1 1942.
85
  By that 
time, Eisler had been living in Los Angeles for seven months, and planned to return to New 
York, and still reported his plans to deposit the entire archive of material at the Museum of 
Modern Art in half a year.  In Los Angeles, as Eisler showed the materials to film industry 
gatherings, he made headway in Hollywood circles, and began to work as a film composer.  The 
materials functioned as a kind of calling card, and he was able to make a living.  The Los 
Angeles Times mentioned Eisler‟s work in an article published in March 1943, in an article by 
Isabel Morse Jones, “Music World to Study Awards by Academy: Solution Sought for Eternal 
Question of Relationship between Film and Score.”  But by 1946 Marshall still hadn‟t received 
the final description of the project‟s results. Eisler responded from his Pacific Palisades home, 
stating on July 27, 1946 that late in 1942, he and Adorno had decided to “pool our theoretical 
ideas and practical experiences and to write the book together.  The German manuscript was 
finished in the summer of 1944.  Publication was held up by the difficulties of translation.  Now, 
however, the English manuscript is ready to go into print as soon as a few minor changes have 
been agreed upon between the Oxford University Press and us.  The book should be out not later 
than sometime in fall or winter.  We should gladly let you have a copy of the English manuscript 
but unfortunately we have none.  We are certain that Mr. Philip Vaudrin of the Oxford 
University Press will give you any further information about the publication.” He clarifies that a 
separate appendix of Composing for the Films would be devoted to a detailed account of the 
Film Music Project, including the analysis of one of the sequences of the “Rain” score, scored 
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for Ivens‟ film of the same name.  In fact, the book provides little analytical discussion of 
Eisler‟s methodologies during composition at all.  However, the “Rain” scores are important, 
but, before turning to a discussion of Eisler‟s results, rain began to fall on Eisler himself. 
On October 17, 1946, The New York World Telegram identified, on the basis of claims by 
a writer for a U.S. Communist newspaper, a “Hans Berger” as the secret Kremlin agent directing 
“all Communist activities in the US”; a woman named Ruth Fischer confirmed the identification.  
“Hans Berger” was in fact Gerhard Eisler, Hans Eisler‟s brother; Ruth Fischer was his sister.  
Gerhard had long continued his pro-Soviet stance, working for the Communist Party in the U.S.; 
Ruth had been expelled from the German Communist movement, supposedly on order from 
Moscow, in 1925.  Ruth, now vehemently anti-communist, confirmed the information about 
Gerhard (if she hadn‟t originated it) and at the same time began a smear campaign against Hans. 
Gerhard was a “key agent” of the Communists and one of the “key figures” in the American 
Communist Party.  The report alarmingly reported that the two brothers of this family deeply 
divided between Gerhard‟s Stalinist sympathies, Ruth‟s Trotskyite resentment, and Hans‟ deep 
depression at German politics were somehow functioning as a cell in Hollywood.  The report 
noted that “[Gerhard] is also the brother of Hanns Eisler, noted exiled German composer, who 
writes music for the movies in Hollywood.  In 1940, the composer received a $20,000 
experimental grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to score sound tracks “in his own style of 
music.”  One of them was the Donald Duck short “His Better Self.”  Mr. Eisler‟s latest screen 
credit was for the Cary Grant-Ethel Barrymore film, “None but the Lonely Heart.” The report 
was syndicated, and other newspapers reprinted it. With news claims about Gerhard, actually a 
journalist, blown up into unproven accusations of his full directorship of Communist attempts at 
destabilizing the U.S. government, and circulated nationally, Hans Eisler became the subject of 
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the federal House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).  Meanwhile, the New York 
Journal American reported on October 23, 1946: “Films Enrich Hanns Eisler, Bard of Reds.”  
He had been subpoenaed to appear before the House Committee on Un-American Activities at 
St. Louis, on November 23, 1946. 
 The claims reported were mostly false, and were falsely supported.  In addition, there 
appear to be confusion in the press reports about the brothers‟ identities, so that the Communist 
activities of one were confused with the film scoring activities of the other – probably much to 
the delight of Ruth Fischer.  Protests were mailed to the Rockefeller Foundation.  One 
handwritten note filed October 30, 1946, accompanying a report in the Los Angeles Examiner 
read, “Not surprised at communist [Oscar] Levant, but do you scatter your funds this way? Let 
the press know where you stand!”  Oscar Levant, of course, was the classical pianist/film 
comedian; but the hysterics of the letter are clear: the war was over, and the Red Scare was on. 
The Los Angeles Examiner reported in October 1946 that Eisler had been located in 
Hollywood. He hadn‟t been trying to hide, and in fact, had been trying to get publicity for his 
film music work!  But the Examiner published a text to one of the proletarian march songs he 
had composed, in spite of the fact that he hadn‟t written them.  Confusions over divisions of 
musical labor allowed Eisler, then, to be further smeared.   Since Eleanor Roosevelt had written a 
letter in support of admitting him into the country, by this time, this association also functioned 
as evidence against him.  Virgil Thompson wrote in support in the New York Herald Tribune, in 
his “From the Left” column.  He reviewed Eisler (and Adorno, who wasn‟t credited at the time), 
and pithily accused Eisler of writing poorly in English (even though the book had been translated 
from German by Oxford).  Nonetheless, agreeing with the charge that Eisenstein‟s practice was 
essentially that of Hollywood, then, regarding Eisler‟s attempt to demonstrate that serial 
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composition‟s ability to provide neutral compositional material that the film industry has needed 
for “twenty years,” Thomson says “I believe every word of it.”  Finally:  
“Mr. Eisler is now under Federal arrest and in danger of deportation, the charge being, according to his 
lawyer he is an undesirable alien, since he once, in 1926, applied for membership in the German 
Communist party. Whatever the law may decide as to the right of Mr. Eisler to remain in this country, there 
can be no question that he is a good composer and a musical intelligence of high quality.  American music 
would be the poorer if he left us.” 
 
Composing for the Films had been published in late summer of that year.  But if it 
garnered support form leftist critics, with its New York institutional pedigree and its insider‟s 
knowledge of Hollywood, a New York Times article of September 26, 1947 seemed to imply that 
Eisler had had too much access to elite institutions and media circles; he knew too much. The 
article implies, with its statements that Alvin Johnson didn‟t know that Eisler had once applied 
for membership in the German Communist Party, that Eisler had been, in effect, a spy.  Iris 
Barry responded to David Stevens‟ request for comment on the book.  In Barry‟s typically to-
the-point way, she says that didn‟t fully understand the serial compositional techniques 
discussed, but she found the book useful for learning something about them.  Alvin Johnson fired 
a letter directly to the Rockefeller Foundation on December 6, 1948: 
“I am writing to you as one educator to another, not as an applicant to the Rockefeller Foundation, where I 
am probably blacklisted on account of Hanns Eisler, who worked under the New School on a Rockefeller 
grant, and did a damn good job on music for the movies, but had the rotten taste to choose the wrong womb 
to come out of, a womb that produced a brother, who for all I know was a spy, and a total bitch of a sister, 
Trotzkyite [sic], who could not forgive Gerhard for turning Stalinist and repudiating the ideal of a world 
revolution.  Hanns was non-political but did tunes the revolutionars (sic) sung, as you and I sing the melody 
of “God Save the King” [sic] and call it „America‟.” 
 
Eisler, after a fiery testimony before HUAC railed at the committee for destroying his 
ability to make a living in Hollywood, (available in the UCLA film archive) underwent voluntary 
deportation after the hearing to avoid forced deportation.  A photo of Eisler applauding at a 
meeting of the Kulturbund (Cultural Society) of the Communist GDR after his deportation to 
Austria, showed him seated with other socialist artistic luminaries, thus implying “proof” of the 
“criminal” behavior Eisler was supposed to have “lied” about, but which was in effect the 
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outcome of a series of transformations in U.S. political culture in the wake of World War II. 
Later scholars would attribute this cultural arm, manifested here in Eisler‟s HUAC hearing, to 
political tactics aimed at diminishing the perceived influence of Eleanor Roosevelt.   
 The caption under a photo of Eisler run in the New York Times on October 29, 1948 read, 
“Hanns Eisler appears at Communist Meeting in Berlin.” Burris-Meyer‟s project ended with a 
sense of the “blazes in the trees” of his musical imagination, as he speculated about the musical 
effects that he thought both the politics of Fascism necessitated and the new sciences of 
electronic acoustics would make possible. Today this seems like a mixture of historical 
tendencies toward deploying musica practica (useful music) for “music therapy” and the overall 
musical atmospherics for mass cultural listening. After deportation Eisler would go on to work 
with Brecht once again at the Berliner Ensemble in Berlin, where in 1959 he would witness a 
long delayed presentation of the Deutsches Requiem, which he composed between 1930 and 
1957. There, as a member of the East German intellectual establishment, he would defend, in an 
interview given in 1958, East German youth who were under attack in the GDR for indulging in 
what he agreed was the false ecstasy of “boogie-woogie” and the “stupid” fashion of American-
style jeans. Eisler commented, “We have good young people.  Let‟s have a strong politics, not a 
strong aesthetics.  We can‟t achieve a strong aesthetic because the American culture industries 
have a monumental influence over the entire world.”86  Perhaps the GDR state culture industries 
responded, in their fashion, with their sanctioning of “the Lipsi,” a more decorous form of 
couples dancing, designed to mediate the influence of the strongly raced and gendered U.S. 
dance craze, the Twist. After returning to the GDR, Eisler divided his time between Berlin and 
Austria. He died in 1962. Other sources have reported that neither he nor Brecht ever gave up 
their Austrian passports. 
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